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A cognitive model of social influence (Social Sampling Theory: SST) is developed and 
applied to several social network phenomena including polarization and contagion 
effects. Social norms and individuals’ private attitudes are represented as distributions 
rather than the single points used in most models. SST is explored using agent-based 
modeling to link individual-level and network-level effects. People are assumed to 
observe the behavior of their social network neighbors and thereby infer the social 
distribution of particular attitudes and behaviors.  It is assumed that (a) people dislike 
behaving in ways that are extreme within their neighborhood social norm (social 
extremeness aversion assumption), and hence tend to conform and (b) people prefer to 
behave consistently with their own underlying attitudes (authenticity preference 
assumption) hence minimizing dissonance. Expressed attitudes and behavior reflect a 
utility-maximizing compromise between these opposing principles. SST is applied to a 
number of social phenomena including (a) homophily and the development of segregated 
neighborhoods, (b) polarization, (c) effects of norm homogeneity on social conformity, 
(d) pluralistic ignorance and false consensus effects, (e) backfire effects, (f) interactions 
between world view and social norm effects, and (g) the opposing effects on subjective 
well-being of authentic behavior and high levels of social comparison. More generally, it 
is argued that explanations of social comparison require the variance, not just the central 
tendency, of both attitudes and beliefs about social norms to be accommodated.  
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Social Sampling and Expressed Attitudes: Authenticity Preference and Social 
Extremeness Aversion Lead to Social Norm Effects and Polarization 
Why does group discussion lead to polarization, why do people prefer to pay selective 
attention to opinions similar to their own, and why does exposure to neutral or even 
contradictory evidence sometimes strengthen pre-existing opinions? What cognitive 
mechanisms underpin social contagion effects, causing attitudes and behaviors to spread 
through social networks over time? Here we examine how cognitive models of 
individuals’ context-based judgments can be applied to understanding of social norms, 
confirmation bias, polarization, and other social phenomena that occur at the level of 
social networks.  
 Social context has long been known to influence people’s behavior and the 
attitudes that people express (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Hyman, 1942). People compare 
themselves with others (Goethals & Darley, 1977) and often adjust their behavior in the 
direction of a social norm (see Buunk & Gibbons, 2007, for a review). The term “social 
norm” is used in a number of different ways (Bicchieri, 2006; Morris, Hong, Chiu, & Liu, 
2015); here we focus on descriptive social norms (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991), 
which simply refer to what people are observed to do and say (i.e., the attitudes and 
beliefs people publicly express and the behaviors they engage in).1   
More recently, social influence has been one of the key principles underpinning 
the concept of “nudging” as a method for guiding and influencing people's behavior 
without restricting their freedom of choice (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The related idea 
that social contagion occurs, leading to the spread of behaviors such as smoking 
cessation, exercise levels, or excessive drinking through social networks (e.g., Aral & 
Nicolaides, 2017; Rosenquist, Murabito, Fowler, & Christakis, 2010), has attracted both 
attention and controversy. Other research has examined polarization both in the 
laboratory (see Sunstein, 2009, for a review) and on social media such as Twitter 
(Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Garimella & Weber, 2017), with a 
                                               
1 Descriptive social norms therefore contrast with injunctive social norms, which are 
concerned with beliefs about what people ought to do rather than what they typically do.  
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particular interest in the relation between polarization, social media, and disinformation 
(Tucker et al., 2018). Additional lines of investigation search for the nature and causes of 
the increased political polarization that has occurred particularly in developed Western 
countries over recent decades (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006), while also 
identifying situations where polarization does not occur or may reduce (Baldassarri & 
Bearman, 2007; Boxell, Gentzkow, & Shapiro, 2017; Festinger, 1954; Fiorina & Abrams, 
2008). In related work, recent laboratory studies have examined how judgments 
propagate along social chains  (Moussaid, Herzog, Kammer, & Hertwig, 2017) and 
models of the social dynamics of risk transmission have been developed (Moussaid, 
Brighton, & Gaissmaier, 2015).  
The individual cognitive processes underlying these well-established social 
phenomena are however only poorly understood. Many models of social comparison 
processes have remained at the level of verbal expression and have not made contact with 
quantitative cognitive models of judgment and decision-making, reflecting a lack of 
cross-talk between cognitive models of context-based judgment and social approaches 
(cf. Treat & Viken, 2010; we note some exceptions below).  
Here we present a computational account that we hope can start to bridge 
individual and social levels of description. We develop a quantitative model of social 
judgment and social influence at the level of the individual, based on independently-
motivated models of judgment and choice, and then use agent-based simulations to 
explore the model’s behavior at a network level. Our primary aim is to shed light on a 
wider number of known phenomena than previous models have been able to account for, 
and to do so in a way that respects well-established cognitive principles of individual 
judgment and decision-making. However the model also makes predictions that we 
believe to be novel, and we summarize these at the end of the paper as well as exploring 
the effects of varying model parameters as we describe the model’s behavior. 
Our model (SST, for Social Sampling Theory) assumes that individuals have 
private attitudes and attitude-related beliefs that may not be consciously accessible to the 
individuals themselves and which may differ from the attitudes and beliefs that the 
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individuals publicly express. SST assumes that individuals lose utility2 if their publicly 
expressed attitudes differ from the ones they privately hold. Why, then, would individuals 
ever express attitudes that differ from those that they privately hold? SST’s answer is that 
individuals infer norms in their social neighborhoods by observing the attitudes and 
attitude-related beliefs expressed by their network neighbors. These social norms are 
represented as distributions, and individuals also lose utility to the extent that their 
publicly expressed attitudes are extreme within the social distribution.  
Those two competing motivations — authenticity preference on the one hand and 
social extremeness aversion on the other — determine people’s public expressions of 
attitudes and attitude-related beliefs. In a nutshell, people want to be “true to themselves” 
but they also do not want to be seen as “extreme” within their social networks. Thus, 
individuals’ choices about what attitudes to express in a given social environment reflect 
the tension that arises when there is a discrepancy between their private attitudes and the 
prevailing social norms.  
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. First, we provide an intuitive 
description of the model. We then motivate the model’s assumptions, and locate it with 
respect to previous accounts. The majority of the paper is devoted to showing how the 
model accounts for specific phenomena.  
 
Intuitive Illustration of the Model 
Much of the explanatory ability of SST derives from its assumption that both 
private attitudes and social norms are represented as distributions rather than single 
points; this assumption allows us to represent both the precision of private attitudes and 
the degree of consensus underlying social norms. Narrower (more sharply peaked) 
                                               
2 We use “utility” to refer to that quantity that, according to the model, people seek to 
maximize. We avoid terms such as “subjective well-being” or “happiness” both because 
well-being is a multidimensional construct and because we do not wish to assume 
conscious awareness of the maximized quantity. However we do (in contrast to common 
usage of the term within economics) think of utility as a psychological, and potentially 
measurable, quantity. 
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distributions represent more precise attitudes or greater social consensus. We argue below 
that this emphasis on distributions rather than single points is essential both to account for 
phenomena such as backfire and norm homogeneity effects and to render the model 
consistent with independent evidence for rank-based judgment. 
The process of observing neighbors’ behaviors and inferring a social norm is 
illustrated in panels A through C of Figure 1. We illustrate with a hypothetical person, 
Alison, and (in this example, political) attitudes represented from zero (left-wing/liberal) 
to 1 (right-wing/Conservative). Figure 1A illustrates Alison’s private attitude; her attitude 
is moderately liberal (median equals .3) and is held with a moderate degree of conviction 
(the distribution that represents her attitude is neither very narrow nor very wide). In 
almost all the simulations below we assume that these private attitudes are fixed for each 
individual. We can think of the height of the curve at any point on the ideological 
continuum as expressing the extent to which an individual would endorse or accept that 
ideological position. The .3 (median) represents the attitude that Alison would express if 
she were uninfluenced by the attitudes expressed by other people. Alison’s private 
attitude is not visible either to other people or to herself.3 Alison also observes the 
political viewpoints expressed by her social network neighbors. (We assume she observes 
each neighbor just once.) The views expressed by Alison’s eight nearest neighbors are 
illustrated by the eight small circles lying just above the horizontal axis of Figure 1B. All 
of these views happen to fall to the right of centre, and are clustered around a median of 
about .7. These observed attitudes inform Alison’s belief about the ideological social 
norm that prevails in her neighborhood. 
Next, Alison infers the social norm by fitting (or at least behaving as if she is 
fitting) a distribution to the attitudes she has observed her neighbors expressing. The 
inferred social norm in this example is illustrated by the solid grey line in panel 1C. Thus 
Alison’s representation of the social norm — just like her representation of her own 
                                               
3 The latter assumption — that Alison has no direct access to her own private attitudes —
is not strictly required for the present demonstrations but resonates with the idea that we 
infer our own attitudes and preferences from our own behavior much as an observer does 
(Bem, 1967; Wilson, 2002).  
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private attitude — is a distribution, not a single point. Her representation of the social 
norm is unbiased in the sense that it accurately reflects the attitudes expressed by her 
social network neighbors, but it will be a biased estimate of the wider population norm if 
her neighbors’ attitudes are not representative.  
The political attitude that Alison will express is hypothesized to depend both on 
her own private attitude and on her perception of the social norm (neither of which is 
assumed to be consciously available). In intuitive terms, Alison will tend to express an 
attitude that is not too far away from her own private attitude (i.e., she will want to be 
true to herself), but she will also tend to conform to the prevailing social norm. We refer 
to these tendencies as authenticity preference and social extremeness aversion 
respectively, and assume that expressed attitudes will reflect a utility-maximizing 
compromise between these often-opposing principles.4  
To illustrate, suppose Alison expresses her median political attitude of .3. This 
viewpoint of .3 would lie in the most liberal few percent of the social norm distribution 
that Alison has inferred from observation of her neighbors (see Figure 1C), and although 
her authenticity preference would be completely satisfied Alison would lose utility due to 
being “socially extreme”. Alternatively, Alison could express an attitude of .75. She 
would then be conforming completely to the social norm, and would experience no social 
extremeness aversion, but her authenticity preference would not be well satisfied.  
If Alison expresses the “compromise” attitude shown by the vertical dashed line 
(i.e., .48; see Figure 1D) the social extremeness of her expressed attitude will be less than 
if she expresses her “authentic” attitude of .3, but she will only partly satisfy her 
authenticity preference. This compromise attitude is close to the centre of the political 
continuum, and therefore represents an attitude that is moderate compared to the more 
extreme liberal position represented by Alison’s private attitude. We assume that Alison 
loses utility to the extent that this expressed attitude is extreme within the distribution that 
represents her private attitude. The extent of this loss is represented by the area shaded in 
                                               
4 This idea resonates with, and indeed our model can be seen as one possible 
implementation of,  Kuran’s (1995) account of a tension between intrinsic and expressive 
utility. 
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dark grey in Figure 1E. The larger this area, the greater the loss of utility that is 
experienced. We also assume that Alison loses utility to the extent that this expressed 
attitude is extreme within the distribution that represents her perception of the social 
norm. The extent of this loss is represented by the area shaded in light grey in Figure 1F. 
Below, we quantify authenticity preference and social extremeness aversion and 
show through simulation that in a range of conditions it is utility-maximizing for Alison 
to express a compromise attitude – i.e., to allow her behavior to be affected by the social 
norm. We also explore conditions under which Alison’s behavior will be less affected  by 
the social norm. For example, when the social norm is both highly homogeneous and 
located far away from Alison’s own attitude, Alison will lose much authenticity, yet still 
remain socially extreme, if she shifts her expressed attitude towards the social norm. 
Under such conditions it can be utility-maximizing for Alison to be “true to herself” and 
express her authentic attitude even in the face of an opposing social norm. 
In a second set of simulations we examine the behavior of a network of simulated 
agents in which each agent’s choice of attitude to express is governed by authenticity 
preference and social extremeness aversion as just described, and in which each agent’s 
social norm is determined by the expressed attitudes of its social network neighbors. 
Expressed attitudes therefore reflect the outcome of a complex dynamic interplay 
between network agents. Agents have an incentive to choose social network neighbors 
with attitudes similar to their own (this motivated behavior arises because the agents can 
then express attitudes that satisfy their authenticity preference without experiencing as 
much social extremeness aversion). Thus if agents are allowed to change their social 
network locations, they exhibit homophily and we show that this leads to polarization in 
the social network (polarization occurs when agents with extreme underlying private 
attitudes become less constrained in their choice of attitude to express after they change 
their social/informational environment to exclude the moderating influence of opposing 
attitudes).  
Thus two key assumptions in SST concern social extremeness aversion and 
authenticity preference. Both are independently motivated. The idea of extremeness 
aversion as we use it here originates in the literature on judgment and decision making 
and captures the idea that people typically choose “compromise” options (Simonson & 
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Tversky, 1992). Extremeness aversion has been shown to influence real-world consumer 
choices of, for example, food portion size (Sharpe, Staelin, & Huber, 2008); SST extends 
the notion of extremeness aversion to the domain of social norms. There is also a large 
body of research on social conformity in a variety of fields (e.g., Bernheim, 1994; 
Bicchieri, 2006; Claidiere & Whiten, 2012); we touch on aspects of this literature 
throughout. 
The authenticity preference assumption is intended to have intuitive plausibility, 
but also receives support from research on the relationship between subjective well-being 
and various conceptions of authenticity. One conceptualization of authenticity focuses on 
the consistency with which personality traits are expressed in different social contexts 
(e.g., Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi, 1997); another examines self-ratings of 
“falseness to self” and related constructs (Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, 1996). 
The recent Tripartite Model of authenticity (A. M. Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & 
Joseph, 2008) has “accepting social influence” as one of its factors and there are clear 
correlations between authenticity and various measures of subjective well-being. While 
such findings provide some motivation for our model, in that we assume utility is lost to 
the extent that overt behavior (expressed attitudes) departs from what would be mandated 
by internal private attitudes alone, we make no claim that our simple quantification 
captures the full richness of current psychological conceptions of authenticity.  
The model aspires to offer some simple principles that apply to a wide range of 
phenomena rather than provide detailed fits to specific sets of data. Table 1 summarises 




Our cognitive approach to social comparison is motivated by and builds on three 
separate traditions of research. The first concerns the idea that people rely on small 
samples, drawn either from their memories or from the environment, in estimating 
quantities; the second has developed rank-based models of exactly how judgments are 
influenced by the context of comparison, and the third aims to integrate individual-
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cognitive and social levels of description through social simulation using agent-based 
models. We briefly outline the background for each of these.  
 
Judgment and Inference Based on Small Samples 
We assume that social judgments — such as an estimate of a social norm — are 
made on the basis of small samples retrieved from memory at the time the judgment must 
be made (see also Galesic, Olsson, & Rieskamp, 2012, 2018; Pachur, Hertwig, & 
Rieskamp, 2013; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006). This approach is consistent with 
findings that judgments are often made on the basis of a relatively small number of 
observations that are either recalled or immediately available in an experimental 
environment at the time judgment must be made (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Juslin, 2006; 
Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007). The use of small samples may amplify differences 
between alternative payoffs (Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010) and correlations (Kareev, 1995, 
2000), but can also lead to biased judgments (Fiedler & Juslin, 2006; Kareev, 2000). This 
bias, which can result from the polarization and segregation mechanisms that we describe 
below, is responsible for a number of the phenomena we aim to account for.  
Following some other recent models (e.g., Galesic et al., 2012; Pachur et al., 
2013), as well as older accounts from an agent-based modeling tradition (e.g., Latan & 
Wolf, 1981; Nowak, Szamrej, & Latané, 1990) and mathematical sociology (e.g., Social 
Influence Network Theory: Friedkin & Johnsen, 2011), we assume that the process of 
sampling from the immediate (local) social environment may explain various social 
phenomena (see also Bergh & Lindskog, 2019; Denrell, 2005; Galesic et al., 2018; Hills 
& Pachur, 2012; Schulze, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2020). 
Our research builds on and extends these perspectives by offering a utility-
maximizing framework to explain exactly how it is that biased social or informational 
sampling links to individual perceptions of social norms. 
  
Rank-based Relative Judgments 
 We have already mentioned SST’s assumption that a social norm is represented as 
a distribution rather than a single point. This assumption allows us to model the 
evaluation of an expressed attitude or attitude-related belief (e.g., for its social 
SOCIAL	SAMPLING	THEORY	 11	
extremeness) not by how it relates to the average attitude expressed by others (a mean-
based social norm) but instead by how it ranks in the distribution of others’ attitudes (a 
rank-based social norm).  
The assumption that judgments are made relative to a single comparison point, 
which is typically some measure of the central tendency of contextual items (cf. Helson, 
1964) and often simply taken to be the mean, is made in many areas of psychology. We 
refer to this as a mean-relative approach. Thus it is often suggested that quantities such as 
prices, healthy body weights, or amounts of alcohol consumption are evaluated in terms 
of their relationship to a "reference", "typical", or "average" level (e.g., Blanchflower, 
Oswald, & Van Landeghem, 2009; Mazumdar, Raj, & Sinha, 2005). According to the 
mean-relative approach a person might judge their alcohol consumption as excessive to 
the extent that it exceeds others’ average level of drinking (Neighbors, Larimer, & Lewis, 
2004), or they might compare their income to the mean income of an occupational or 
social reference group of some kind (e.g., Clark & Oswald, 1996). The same assumption 
of mean-relative judgment is often implicit in social norm interventions, where people are 
given information about mean energy consumption about the mean level of others’ 
energy usage (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007), alcohol 
consumption (Neighbors et al., 2004), or contributions to a public goods game 
(Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010) in the expectation that behavior will tend to adjust in the 
direction of the social norm (see also Lewin, 1952).  
 However, both intuition and experimental evidence call the mean-relative 
approach into question. Consider for example a person who is informed that they use 120 
units of energy per month, while their social network neighbors use 90, 100, and 110 
units per month. Intuitively, the person will feel that their consumption is rather high in 
relation to the social norm. Suppose that the same individual was instead told that their 
social network neighbors use 20, 100, and 180 units of energy per month. It seems likely 
that the person’s consumption of 120 units per month will feel subjectively less deviant 
from the social norm — less socially extreme — in this second context. But the mean of 
others’ consumptions is 100 in both cases, suggesting that people are sensitive to how 
their own behavior ranks within the distribution represented by the social norm.  
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 The general idea that subjective judgments are often judgments of relative rank 
within some distribution was initially developed in the context of psychophysical 
judgment (Parducci, 1965, 1995), and findings of rank effects in that domain were 
subsequently extended to domains as diverse as, e.g., sweetness perception (Riskey, 
Parducci, & Beauchamp, 1979), moral judgments (Marsh & Parducci, 1978), perception 
of body image (Wedell, Santoyo, & Pettibone, 2005), student grading fairness (Wedell, 
Parducci, & Roman, 1989), and prices (Niedrich, Sharma, & Wedell, 2001; Niedrich, 
Weathers, Hill, & Bell, 2009). Judgments of “fair” allocations of wage and tax increases 
also follow rank-based principles (Mellers, 1982, 1986), as do judgments of other 
economic quantities (Boyce, Brown, & Moore, 2010; Brown, Gardner, Oswald, & Qian, 
2008; Smith, Diener, & Wedell, 1989) and event-rated death tolls (Olivola & Sagara, 
2009). In process terms, rank-based judgments may be formed through a process of 
sampling followed by binary ordinal comparison (Stewart et al., 2006) or by directly 
estimating value in a cumulative distribution; we return to the distinction between these 
in the General Discussion. 
 According to this rank-based perspective, people’s judgments should be affected 
by (a) their beliefs about social norm distributions, along with (b) their belief about where 
they rank within that distribution. Consistent with such a view, an individual’s belief 
about where their own behavior (e.g., their alcohol consumption or exercise levels) ranks 
within a perceived social norm (“subjective rank”, e.g., whether they are in the heaviest-
drinking 15% of the population) predicts that individual’s attitude towards their own 
behavior (e.g., whether they are drinking “too much”). Judgments are based on people’s 
personal beliefs about their social rank not just for quantities such alcohol and exercise 
amount (Maltby, Wood, Vlaev, Taylor, & Brown, 2012; Taylor, Vlaev, Maltby, Brown, 
& Wood, 2015; A. M. Wood, Brown, & Maltby, 2012), but for quantities as varied as 
food healthiness and food consumption (Aldrovandi, Brown, & Wood, 2015), depression 
and anxiety symptoms (Melrose, Brown, & Wood, 2013), student indebtedness 
(Aldrovandi, Wood, Maltby, & Brown, 2015), dishonesty (Aldrovandi, Wood, & Brown, 
2013), and student experience (Brown, Wood, Ogden, & Maltby, 2015).  
 In summary, there is considerable independent support for the idea that people’s 
judgments and attitudes are influenced by where they believe themselves to rank within a 
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perceived distribution that represents a social norm. SST aims to provide a quantitative 
footing for the psychological processes underlying these rank-based social norm effects.  
 
Agent-based Modeling Approaches 
A further aim of SST is to show how rank-based social judgments at the 
individual level, as reviewed in the previous section, can lead to emergent phenomena 
such as polarization at a social network level. To do this we use a simple agent-based 
model (ABM). ABMs enable the collective behavior and emergent properties of 
neighborhood-sensitive agents to be studied (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010; Newman, Watts, 
& Strogatz, 2002; Schelling, 1971) and have a long history of application in a number of 
social as well as physical sciences, with a particular focus having been on how group-
level structure may emerge as a result of the actions of individuals. They have provided 
useful insights into areas such as collective behavior in ants and traders (Kirman, 1993), 
swarming behavior (Reynolds, 1987), crowd behavior (Dyer, Johansson, Helbing, 
Couzin, & Krause, 2009), population group size (Axtell et al., 2002), cultural 
dissemination (Axelrod, 1997), segregation (e.g. Schelling, 1978), and imitative voting 
(Bernardes, Stauffer, & Kertesz, 2002). Within psychology, ABMs have been applied to 
the development of cooperation and the spread of behaviors through populations (see 
Goldstone & Janssen, 2005; Jackson, Rand, Lewis, Norton, & Gray, 2017; Macy & 
Willer, 2002; Madsen, Sailey, Carrella, & Koralus, 2019, for reviews from the 
perspectives of cognitive science, computational sociology and social psychology).   
Here we exploit the ability of ABMs to bridge cognitive and social approaches, 
with the specific aim of showing how polarization can emerge from the tension between 
extremeness aversion (defined in terms of rank-based social norms) and authenticity 
preference. SST has a number of important predecessors, such as the cultural spread 
model (Axelrod, 1997) in which agents are endowed with beliefs and attitudes and 
interact with other agents with a probability that depends upon their overall similarity. 
Upon interaction, individuals become more similar to one another. There are numerous 
extant ABMs of, for example, segregation (e.g., Schelling, 1971), social impact (Nowak 
et al., 1990) and social influence (e.g., Bentley, Ormerod, & Batty, 2011; Flache & Macy, 
2011a; Friedkin & Johnsen, 2011), and such models can shed light on social sampling 
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and the biases that result from it (Galesic et al., 2012, 2018; Pachur et al., 2013; Schulze 
et al., 2020). Models of attitude and belief polarization have been developed within both 
ABM and Bayesian traditions (see especially Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007; Flache & 
Macy, 2011b; Jern, Chang, & Kemp, 2014; Maes & Flache, 2013; Van Overwalle & 
Heylighen, 2006). Voinea (2016) provides a historical overview of simulation modeling 
approaches to political attitudes.  SST differs from these earlier models particularly in (a) 
its emphasis on rank-based relative judgment, and (b) its focus on a tension between 
social extremeness aversion on the one hand and authenticity preference on the other. It is 




 We model individual agents situated within a network. Each simulated social 
agent in the model occupies a location on the grid, and can observe the behavior only of 
its eight local neighbors. This neighborhood structure is illustrated in Figure 2, where the 
black square highlights one agent in a 7x7 grid and the grey squares highlight the 
immediate neighbors whose behaviors (i.e., expressions of attitudes) are visible to that 
agent.  
Although the network of agents is modeled (and graphically illustrated) as a 
spatial grid, the grid dimensions can represent any social or informational dimensions 
relevant to a social norm. For example, the grid could be taken to represent a social 
structure such that agents occupying a particular location in the grid spend social time 
with agents in nearby locations (which need not be physical locations but could be 
socially-constructed “locations” such as shared blogs). The network structure can 
therefore be thought of as informational (surrounding network locations represent sources 
of information, such as blogs or newspapers, that the agent attends to); we adopt a simple 
spatial interpretation for the purposes of explanation. 
In the simulations below, we explore the effects of allowing agents to move to 
different locations in the network; this represents the agent choosing to associate with 
other agents located in a particular area of the grid (e.g., because those agents share 
similar political or other views to those of the agents who move) or attending to particular 
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sources of information (e.g., newspapers). In other words, a move of an agent from one 
location to another will in reality more often represent a choice to socialize with, read the 
same newspapers as, and influence and be influenced by, a particular set of agents rather 
than a decision to move house to a different region of the city. 
 The neighborhood is a torus — i.e., it wraps round along horizontal and vertical 
edges. Thus an agent in a given row in the extreme right-hand column of grid will have as 
one of its neighbors the agent in the same row of the extreme left-hand column of the 
grid. In most of the simulations described below, we use a 100x100 grid. The simple 
network structure shown here is similar to that introduced by, e.g., Schelling (1969, 1971) 
to illustrate how neighborhood segregation could occur as a result of people having even 
slight preferences to move to a location where they were surrounded by same-race 
neighbors, except that we do not allow empty locations. The Schelling approach has 
sparked the development of an enormous number of derivative versions and applications 
in disparate disciplines (see, e.g., Rogers & McKane, 2011, for a recent analysis); we do 
not review these here.  
 
Agents’ Private Attitudes 
 Each agent i in the network is endowed with a fixed and private attitude defined 
as a distribution over an interval between 0 and 1 on the dimension of interest. For 
example, as in the informal example discussed earlier, the number between 0 and 1 could 
represent a one-dimensional political attitude, where 0 represents an extreme left-wing 
attitude and 1 represents an extreme right-wing attitude. We will use this example of 
political attitude to illustrate many of the points below. However the same type of 
representation is assumed to underpin attitudes more generally.  
Each agent’s underlying private attitude is assigned randomly at the outset and 
remains fixed throughout most the simulations reported here. Our account thus assumes 
private attitudes to be fixed characteristics of individuals, akin to deeply-held values or 
personality traits, which typically show strong evidence of both heritability and stability 
over the lifespan (see, e.g., Mondak, 2010). In Demonstration S2 (in Supplementary 
Online Material) we do however explore the consequences of relaxing this assumption, 
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and show that allowing private attitudes to move incrementally in the direction of 
expressed attitudes leads to reducing, rather than increasing, polarization over time. 
A central assumption of our model is that agents’ private attitudes are not directly 
observable by social network neighbors. Instead, social network neighbors have access 
only to the overt behavior (e.g., behavioral statements of attitudes) of other agents. This 
overt behavior is, as we explain below, assumed to be influenced by additional factors, 
such as social norms, which do not influence the private underlying attitudes.  
Specifically, we assume that each agent’s private attitude along a particular 
dimension can be expressed as a beta distribution. A beta distribution is bounded between 
0 and 1 and has two shape parameters, a and b, which together specify both the central 
tendency of the distribution and its width (variance). Each individual i in the social 
network has their own a and b parameters, ai and bi, and hence their private attitude is 
given by beta(ai, bi). 
 Representing attitudes as distributions rather than single points allows us to 
distinguish between the central tendency of the distribution and the strength with which it 
is held.5 In intuitive terms, there is a distinction between “extreme views weakly held” 
and “moderate views strongly held” that can be captured only if the central tendency and 
variance of the attitude are separately represented. Figure 3 illustrates the representation 
of different attitudes. The black solid curve is beta(4, 9) and represents an attitude with a 
central tendency (median) of .3 held with medium strength. Using the example of 
political attitude, this could represent a slightly left of centre (liberal) attitude held with a 
moderate degree of conviction.  
We define the width of the distribution in terms of its precision (i.e., the reciprocal 
of the variance); in this case the precision is 65.7. As a and b become smaller, the 
distribution becomes shallower, representing a less strongly held attitude. The grey solid 
line shows beta(1.6, 3.3); this is constructed to have the same median (.3) but the 
precision is reduced to 27.0. To continue the example, this could represent the same left 
of centre (liberal) attitude held with a low degree of conviction. Finally, the dashed curve 
                                               
5 The notion of attitude strength, as quantified here, is distinct from its importance (as 
stated by its holder) or its consequentiality for behavior (Howe & Krosnick, 2017). 
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shows beta(27, 11.8); this would represent a moderately conservative political attitude 
(median = .7) held with a high degree of conviction (precision = 188). The two shape 
parameters of the beta distribution, a and b, can be given a psychological interpretation 
in that they can be thought of as representing the number of arguments considered by the 
agent to favor one or other end of the attitude dimension (cf., Koriat, 2012).  
The private attitudes that we have described are assumed in our model to be an 
important, but not the only, influence on actual behavior. Next, we explain how social 
norms are estimated in the model and how they, combined with private attitudes, 
influence agents’ choices of what attitude to express. 
 
Inferring Social Norms 
Recall that each agent is assumed to have access through observation to the 
expressed attitudes of its eight local neighbors (Figure 2). The second assumption of the 
model is that agents represent social norms as distributions, and that they infer these 
social norms from observing the expressed attitudes of their network neighbors, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. We label the parameters of the social norm that describes the 
neighbors of agent i as ani and bni, and hence the social norm is given by beta(ani, bni).   
As with private attitudes, representing social norms by distributions rather than 
single points allows the central tendency of a social norm to be represented independently 
of the degree of social consensus surrounding it. The attitudes expressed by Alison’s 
neighbors could have been more homogeneous (e.g. clustered much more tightly around 
a median of .7) in which case Alison’s representation of the social norm would be taller 
and narrower. Alternatively, a shallower (lower consensus) social norm with the same 
median could be inferred if the attitudes expressed by Alison’s neighbors were more 
heterogeneous. As we will see below, the ability to represent the degree of social 
consensus in this way will be important in understanding the magnitude and even the 
direction of social norm influences. 
 
Authenticity Preference  
  It is assumed that — absent other considerations — an individual will prefer to 
express an attitude near the centre (here operationalized as the median) of the distribution 
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that represents their own private attitude. To the extent that their expressed attitudes 
depart from their true attitudes in order to accommodate other constraints such as the 
desire not to occupy an extreme location within the social norm (see below), they lose 
utility. This is the authenticity preference assumption. The degree to which an expressed 
attitude departs from this median will be determined by how much the relative ranked 
position of the expressed attitude (within the cumulative of the distribution that represents 
the authentic attitude) departs from .5. Formally, if the expressed attitude is denoted by Ai 
and Ai is greater than the median of the private attitude the utility loss increases with: 
 
	𝐼"#(𝛼&, 𝛽&) − 0.5	 	 (1)	
 
which is the dark shaded area in Figure 1E. 𝐼.(𝛼, 𝛽) represents the position of x in the 
cumulative density function of beta(a,b), and 𝐼.
[01](a,b)	represents the inverse of the 
cumulative density function. Thus the preference for authenticity would be met 
completely only when Ai is the median of the private attitude, i.e., when  𝐴& =
𝐼.6
[01](𝛼&, 𝛽&). 
 To give a concrete example, recall that Figure 3 illustrates two different authentic 
attitudes – both with the same median (.3) but differing in precision. Consider the loss of 
authenticity that will result from expressing an attitude of .4 in each case. The relative 
ranked position of .4 in the more precise distribution (i.e., its position in the cumulative 
density function) is .77, and hence (by Equation 1 above) the loss of utility associated 
with expressing the .4 will be .77-.5 = .27. In contrast, the relative ranked position of .4 in 
the less precise distribution is .67, and the associated utility loss would be .17. Thus the 
loss of authenticity associated with expressing an attitude that is a fixed distance 
(here, .1) from the central tendency of the authentic attitude is greater when the authentic 
attitude is more precise. 
 In other words, the loss of utility associated with the preference for authenticity 
does not depend just on the distance between the (median) private attitude and the 
expressed attitude Ai. Instead, the loss of utility will depend also on the width of the 
private attitude distribution. If the distribution is narrow, indicating that precision is high, 
a shift in attitude of .1 away from the median attitude will cause a greater loss of utility 
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than will the same shift in attitude when the private attitude distribution is less precise. 
This property captures the intuition that it is more painful to express behavior that is 
inconsistent with a strongly held attitude than it is to express the same behavior in the 
context of a less strongly held attitude. This intuition cannot be captured by single-point 
representations of attitudes. 
 
Social Extremeness Aversion 
We define social extremeness aversion as extremity (distance from the median) in 
the rank ordered distribution that represents the social norm. Specifically, we assume that 
the loss of utility arising from social extremeness aversion is given by the probability 
mass in the social norm distribution that separates the expressed attitude from the median 
of the social norm. This is shown as the light grey area in Figure 1F. Formally, the utility 
loss arising from social extremity is an increasing function of: 
 
	 0.5 − 𝐼(𝛼7&, 𝛽7&)	 (2)	
 
where  𝐼(𝛼, 𝛽) is again the cumulative beta distribution function.6 As with authenticity 
preference, an important feature of this formulation is that disutility arises not simply 
from the distance between an expressed behavior (.48 in the Alison example) and a 
single-point estimate of the social norm (we take the median, here .7). Instead, and in 
contrast to most extant models of social norms, what is assumed to matter is the relative 
ranked position of an expressed attitude within the distribution that represents the social 
norm. The disutility will therefore depend on the degree of social consensus that 
underpins the social norm. If there is a high degree of social consensus, the probability 
distribution that represents the social norm will be sharply peaked and a difference of .22 
between the median of the social norm and the expressed attitude will lead to a greater 
loss of utility than would be produced by the same .22 difference if the social norm is 
                                               
6 We assume here, as with the previous equation, that expressed attitudes fall between the 
median of the social norm and the median of the private attitude. In other cases, the 
absolute values would need to be taken. 
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wider (as it will be if there is a lower degree of social consensus). This way of 
implementing social extremeness aversion captures the intuition that loss of utility 
derived from expressing a view that is different from the median views expressed within 
a social neighborhood will be greater when neighbors are in agreement than when they 
are not, and provides another illustration of the importance of representing norms as 
distributions rather than single points. 
  
Choice of Behavior 
 How do the agents choose what attitude and behavior to express in the light of the 
twin constraints of authenticity preference and social extremeness aversion? We assume 
the agents are rational in the sense that the attitude Ai that each chooses to express in a 
given social context is the one that will maximize their utility. In cases such as those we 
have illustrated, the maximum-utility choice of expressed attitude behavior will fall 
somewhere between the median of the agent’s private attitude and the median of the 
social norm distribution. 
  We have already shown that authenticity preference and social extremeness 
aversion will often tend to pull Ai in opposite directions. We have stated that utility loss 
increases as a function of both the dark shaded and light shaded areas in Figure 1F. Our 
final assumption concerns the rate at which disutility increases as each of those areas 
increases. We aimed to instantiate the intuition that utility loss will be relatively small 
when departures from the median are relatively small, but then will increase sharply as 
extremeness increases. Specifically, we assume that this disutility increases as an 
exponential function of each of the areas illustrated, such that 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑒g(@0.6)	 	 	 (3)	
 
where H is the relevant area and g, the first free parameter of the model, specifies the 
steepness of the increase. Figure 4A shows this function for three different values of 
g (10, 20, and 50). Consider the parameter that characterizes the middle of the three lines 
(i.e., g  = 20). With this parameter value, there would be little or no loss of utility due to 
social extremeness aversion provided the expressed attitude Ai lies within about the 25th 
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and 50th percentile of the social norm. As social extremity increases, however, the loss of 
utility increases ever more quickly such that there is a considerable loss of utility if the 
expressed attitude lies within the most extreme 5% or 10% of the social norm 
distribution. The same equation applies to authenticity preference; here the intuition is 
that one is comfortable to express an attitude that falls within the middle two quartiles of 
the distribution that represents one’s private attitude, but then increasingly loses utility 
with diminishing authenticity such that considerable well-being will be lost if an attitude 
at the extreme of the private attitude distribution must be expressed. In Demonstration S1 
in the Supplementary Online Material we show that this assumption (of increasingly large 
increases in disutility at extremes) is consistent with data from social norm effects in a 
resource dilemma experiment (Bilderbeck et al., 2014). 
  Combining Equations 1, 2 and 3 above, the overall (positive) utility associated 
with the expression of a given attitude Ai will be: 
 
𝑈"# = 1 − C𝑤 × 𝑒
0F(GH#(IJ#,KJ#) + (1 − 𝑤) × 𝑒0FM10GH#(I#,K#)NO	             (4) 
 
where w is a weighting term, here set to .5 by default, such that w is the weight on the 
loss of utility due to social extremeness aversion and (1-w) weights the loss of utility 
arising from the departure from authenticity preference. 
  Figure 4B plots the utility function (thin line) for the private attitude and social 
norm illustrated in Figure 1, with w = .5 and g = 20. It can be seen that the utility-
maximizing Ai is .48, at the point where the vertical dashed line was (intentionally, in 
anticipation) drawn. As w becomes smaller than .5, the weighting on social extremeness 
aversion will reduce and the utility-maximizing Ai will become closer to the median of 
the agent’s private attitude. 
  Most of the psychologically interesting behavior of the model arises from the 
interplay of private attitudes and perceived social norms in determining agents’ utility-
maximizing attitudes to express, and it is to this interplay that we now turn. We first 
explore how the utility-maximizing attitude for an individual agent to express is governed 
by the interaction between the precision of the agent’s own private attitude and the 
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agent’s immediate social environment, then in a separate section explore how 
polarization and other network phenomena can emerge from simple network dynamics. 
 
Individual Agent Simulations 
 
In this first series of simulations we examine how the behavior of a single agent is 
influenced by interactions between (a) the strength of the agent’s private/authentic 
attitude, and (b) the degree of consensus underlying the social norm.  
 
Social Norm Effects 
Numerous studies both in the laboratory and in the field have examined the effects 
of telling people what others do or believe. Provision of social norm information can for 
example influence provision of movie ratings (Chen, Harper, Konstan, & Li, 2010), size 
of voluntary gallery donations (Martin & Randal, 2010), and energy consumption (Allcott 
& Rogers, 2014; Ayres, Raseman, & Shih, 2013; Schultz et al., 2007), as well as 
contributions to public goods in economic games (Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010) and 
preferences for music (Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006). There are many accounts of 
why descriptive and other social norms might have the effects that they do (see, e.g., 
Morris et al., 2015); the focus here is specifically on the psychological processes that 
underlie the influence of social norms on the attitudes that people express.  
Demonstration 1.1: Effects of social comparison on expressed attitudes and 
well-being. We first illustrate the effects of individual differences in sensitivity to social 
norms to provide a quantitative illustration of the effects of authenticity preference. 
Intuition suggests that some people have a strong tendency to conform to a social 
norm, while others are more likely to stay “true to themselves” and are less likely to alter 
the views they express when they are around others who are expressing different views. 
In SST this individual difference is captured by the parameter w (Equation 4), which 
specifies the weight that an agent gives to disutility arising from social extremeness 
aversion relative to the weight given to authenticity preference (i.e., a value of w = 0 
would describe an agent who has the strongest possible authenticity preference). 
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We examine the effects of varying w on the expressed attitude of an agent whose 
true attitude is given by beta(4,9) as illustrated in Figure 3 above — i.e., the median of 
the attitude is 0.3 (e.g., slightly to the left of the political centre) and the attitude is held 
with moderate strength (the distribution is neither very sharply peaked nor very flat). The 
agent’s neighbors are assumed to have the distribution beta(6,2.2) (i.e., there is a 
moderate level of agreement between social neighbors on a politically right-wing attitude 
such that the distribution representing the social norm is neither sharply peaked nor very 
flat). The parameter g  is held fixed at 20. 
Figure 5A shows how the utility-maximizing attitude for the agent to express 
changes as a function of w. As the social comparison parameter w increases, the agent’s 
expressed attitude (i.e., the one whose expression mazimizes the agent’s utility) gradually 
moves away from the agent’s median authentic attitude (.3) towards the median of the 
social norm (.75) and the amount of disutility due to violation of authenticity preference 
increases (Figure 5B). The concomitant reduction in disutility due to social extremeness 
aversion is shown in Figure 5C. 
Demonstration 1.2: Effects of social norm consensus. SST aims to capture, 
quantitatively, the idea that one is likely to be more influenced in the statement one 
expresses when there is a higher degree of social consensus surrounding an opposing 
viewpoint (cf. Asch, 1956). We illustrate the effect of social consensus in Figure 6. The 
private attitude of the agent, as in the previous simulation, is given by beta(4,9), has a 
median of .3, and is illustrated as a probability distribution (dark line) in the top panel. 
However we vary the social norm from low consensus (beta(3.6,1.4); solid grey line) to 
high consensus (beta(30,10.2); dashed grey line) while holding the median (almost 
exactly) constant at .75. We measure the degree of social consensus as the reciprocal of 
the variance (i.e., the precision) of the distribution representing the social norm. The 
social comparison parameter w is held constant at .5.  
The effect of increasing social consensus on an agent’s utility-maximizing Ai is 
illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 6. As the variance in the social norm decreases, 
the expressed attitude which maximizes utility for the agent gradually moves from a 
compromise position of .45 to become ever closer to the median of the social norm. The 
intuition behind this result is as follows. If the views expressed by neighbors are highly 
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diverse (high variance/low precision), the social norm distribution will be relatively flat. 
In such a case, when choosing the optimal attitude to express an agent does not have to 
move very far from its own true authentic belief in order to avoid being too socially 
extreme. Because an agent always wants to express a belief as close as possible to its true 
authentic belief, it will do so provided the cost in social extremeness is not too high. As 
the distribution that represents the social norm becomes narrower, the agent comes to 
express a view that is further away from its own authentic attitude in order to avoid being 
too extreme in the social distribution. 
This demonstration highlights a key difference between SST and alternative 
accounts based on single-point representations of attitudes and social norms. In a model 
with single-point representations, the disutility of an agent could be a function simply of 
the distance between the single-point social norm and the agent’s expressed attitude, 
perhaps along with the distance between the agent’s authentic preference and the agent’s 
expressed attitude. The difference between the two representations is relevant to which 
type of social norm information would be most effective. Norm-based “nudges” typically 
report the mean of the relevant distribution (e.g., alcohol consumption, or energy usage). 
However, if SST’s assumption about social extremeness aversion is correct, it may be 
more effective to tell people where they rank within a social distribution than to tell them 
how they relate to the mean of a distribution.  
Demonstration 1.3: Backfire effects. The principles of extremeness aversion and 
authenticity preference, coupled with the assumption that private attitudes and social 
norms are represented psychologically as distributions rather than single points, can lead 
to otherwise-paradoxical non-monotonic effects of social norms on expressed attitudes. 
One of these is the so-called backfire (or “boomerang”) effect.  
Backfire effects are typically said to occur when the provision of new information 
that is inconsistent with an existing belief or attitude may under some circumstances 
paradoxically lead to further entrenchment of the original opinion. Backfire effects have 
been seen when the relevant new information takes the form of empirical facts (Bail et 
al., 2018; Gollust, Lantz, & Ubel, 2009; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Nyhan, Reifler, & Ubel, 
2013; Redlawsk, 2002) or when the information is in the form of a social norm. For 
example, Hart and Nisbet (2012) found that Republicans became less, not more, 
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supportive of climate mitigation policies when provided with information about the 
potential health impacts of climate change.  Costa and Kahn (2013) find that provision of 
social norm information related to energy conservation may backfire with conservatives 
despite being successful with liberals, and Cook and Lewandowsky (2016) found that 
providing information about scientific consensus (about anthropogenic global warming) 
led to backfire effects specifically in strong supporters of unregulated free markets.  
Backfire effects are not always found (e.g., Guess & Coppock, 2018; T. Wood & 
Porter, 2019), perhaps reflecting differences in tested populations (T. Wood & Porter, 
2019), whether or not the new information is general enough to threaten pre-existing 
attitudes or beliefs (Ecker & Ang, 2019), or perceptions of the reasons for the consensus 
that may provoke the reaction (Conway & Schaller, 2005). Here we examine the 
conditions under which  backfire effects occur in SST. We set w to .3, instead of the .5 
used in the previous demonstration, and again examined the optimal attitude of an agent 
to express as the social consensus increases – just as in the previous demonstration, and 
with the social norm varying continuously from beta(2.4,1.0) (low social consensus) to 
beta(21,7.2) (high social consensus).  
 The result can be seen in Figure 7, where the pattern that is observed is very 
different to the monotonic effect of social consensus observed in the previous 
demonstration. Instead, a backfire effect is observed. As the social consensus increases, 
there is an initial tendency for the agent’s expressed attitude to follow the social norm. 
However, when social consensus (expressed in terms of precision) reaches about 60, the 
expressed attitude that is utility-maximizing for the agent stops moving towards the social 
norm and gradually moves back towards the median of the agent’s private attitude, 
eventually reaching it when social consensus has reached a level of about 120. Thus the 
model exhibits a backfire effect; there comes a point where increased perceived social 
consensus (which could arise for example if an increasing number of social network 
neighbors were observed to express a similar attitude to the one expressed by already-
sampled network neighbors) leads to reduced instead of increased conformity. 
 This apparently paradoxical behavior of the model can be understood as follows. 
In intuitive terms, when the agent’s private attitude is very distant from the social norm 
there comes a point where an agent is better off being “true to itself” than conforming 
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even a small amount. More specifically: When the social consensus is high and the 
median of the social consensus is located far from an agent’s private attitude, the median 
of the private attitude will be out on the flat tail of the social norm. Under such 
circumstances even a small movement away from the agent’s true authentic belief causes 
the normal loss of authenticity-related utility while achieving little gain in conformity-
related utility, because the agent is so far out in the tail of the social norm distribution that 
virtually no reduction in social extremism can be achieved by movement towards the 
social norm. 
 We can use SST to explore further the conditions under which backfire effects 
occur. Authenticity preference and social extremeness aversion and SST’s free 
parameters — w (which determines the amount of social comparison) and g — will 
interact with the precision of agents’ private attitudes and of the social norm, as well as 
with the distance between them, to determine whether backfire effects occur. For 
example, Figure 8 shows the effect of varying w (all other parameters are the same as in 
the previous demonstration). It can be seen that for small values of w, backfire effects 
occur, but that as w increases there is a sudden transition to an environment in which 
conformity increases monotonically with social consensus.  
 The precision of an agent’s own world view is also important and either strong or 
weak private attitudes can lead to rapid step changes in expressed attitudes as social 
consensus increases. Figure 9 presents one such case: Here the precision of the private 
attitude has been reduced to beta(2,4.5) (cf. Figure 6), but all other parameters remain the 
same as above (w = .3; g  =  20). As before, we examine the effect of increasing social 
consensus on the attitudes that it is optimal for the agent to express. Now there is a 
sudden switch in expressed attitude: At first the expressed attitude moves towards the 
social norm as consensus increases, but then there is a sudden change towards 
authenticity-maximizing behavior at a certain level of social consensus. The switch can 
arise because the utility curve is double peaked; the heights of the two peaks (whose 
locations correspond roughly to the authenticity-maximizing attitude on the one hand and 
the social extremeness-minimizing attitude on the other hand) change gradually (one 
increasing; the other decreasing) as consensus changes. There comes a point when the 
“authenticity peak” becomes higher than the “conformity peak”, and at that point there is 
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a sudden change in the optimal attitude to express. In psychological terms, the model 
captures the intuition that there are conditions under which some social conformity is the 
most comfortable position for an agent, but that there are other conditions under which 
the utility-maximizing position is one of complete authenticity or complete conformity. 
Similar sudden transitions can occur in the opposite direction under different 
parameterizations. 
 
Simulations: Network Dynamics and Polarization 
 The demonstrations above illustrate how the behavior of utility-maximizing 
individual agents changes as a function of their private attitude, their perception of the 
social norm, and the w and g  parameters. The remaining demonstrations examine the 
network-level behavior of such agents with a particular emphasis on polarization, 
homophily, and social contagion. SST aims to offer a unified account of these 
phenomena, so we review them briefly together.  
Polarization 
“Polarization” has been interpreted in a number of different ways (Bramson et al., 
2017), but as we model it here is exemplified by the tendency for the attitudes and 
attitude-related beliefs expressed by a group and its members to be more extreme after 
within-group communication than before (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Schkade, 
Sunstein, & Hastie, 2007). We illustrate the basic “stylized fact” in Figure 10. The 
horizontal axis represents endorsements of attitude-related statements (e.g., regarding 
contentious issues such as same-sex unions or the causes of global warming) on a 0-1 
scale. The two distributions in the upper panel represent the distributions of expressed 
attitudes of two groups before discussion, while the two distributions in the lower panel 
represent the changed distributions of the attitudes of the two groups after each has had 
an opportunity for intra-group discussion. The distributions have become more 
homogeneous within groups, but more heterogeneous between groups – polarization has 
occurred. Although there are many subtleties in the large polarization literature, and 
perfectly clean patterns of the type illustrated may not be observed (see Sunstein, 2009 
for a review) the figure illustrates the type of polarization that may be observed in small 
groups over short time scales (Schkade et al., 2007) and which we address with SST 
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below (albeit in the context of a single group). Similar polarization is sometimes seen 
over longer timescales, as in the increased polarization evident in politicians’ voting 
patterns over recent decades (McCarty et al., 2006). We emphasize that our account 
focusses on attitudes rather than beliefs; the phenomena we aim to account for are 
different from (albeit closely related to) those that form the focus of models of belief 
polarization (e.g., Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016) whereby two individuals with initially 
opposing beliefs may have the difference between their beliefs strengthened by exposure 
to the same evidence (see Jern et al., 2014, for a review and model). 
Homophily and Confirmation Bias 
Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek out information consistent with one’s 
existing beliefs or attitudes (Nickerson, 1998), with an associated tendency to maintain 
belief in existing hypotheses despite evidence to the contrary (Klayman & Ha, 1987). 
Confirmatory behavior may be adaptive if the task is to maximize information gain (see 
Navarro & Perfors, 2011; Oaksford & Chater, 1994), and may reflect a preference for 
belief consonance (Golman, Hagmann, & Loewenstein, 2017), but is typically seen as a 
bias and a contributor to polarization (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Here we view the tendency 
to seek out others with attitudes similar to one’s own as a type of confirmation bias, and 
argue that SST provides a possible psychological mechanism for the bias.  A related 
concept, social homophily, is the tendency for “birds of a feather to flock together” – i.e., 
for people to seek out the company of similar others (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 
2001). Our concern here is with what Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) termed “value 
homophily” (a desire to surround oneself with people holding similar values) rather than 
with their “status homophily” (a desire to surround oneself with people occupying similar 
social groups). 
Confirmation bias and homophily, and their consequences, are widely 
documented in the literature and numerous accounts have been proposed. Many of these 
existing accounts are similar in flavor to our own; the contribution of SST is to specify in 
detail the rank-based process of relative judgment at the level of the individual agents and 
how such a process can lead to confirmation bias and social organization at the network 
level. Specifically, SST proposes that confirmation bias and homophily can both be 
modeled by a simple trade-off involving two principal drives: individuals seek to 
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maximize their authenticity-related utility while at the same time minimizing their 
disutility due to social extremeness aversion.  
Social Contagion Effects  
Social contagion effects are said to occur when imitative behavior can be seen 
evolving in social networks over time, such that behaviors such as exercise, obesogenic 
eating, and high levels of alcohol consumption can be seen to propagate through social 
networks (e.g., Aral & Nicolaides, 2017; Christakis & Fowler, 2007, 2008; Datar & 
Nicosia, 2018), reflecting either social environments or the influence of one or more 
“leaders” (Dyer et al., 2009; Johnstone & Manica, 2011). Although interpretation remains 
controversial (e.g., Shalizi & Thomas, 2011), social contagion is often assumed to result 
from imitative behavior that does not merely reflect the tendency for people to surround 
themselves with similar others (homophily) or the tendency for neighboring social agents 
to be subject to common exogenous influences. We show below how social contagion 
effects can arise in SST as a result of social extremeness aversion even in the absence of 
homophily, but that the two are intertwined.   
 
Simulations 
Demonstration 2.1: Polarization. We illustrate polarization with a simulation in 
which agents can choose to move to a different part of the network (thus changing their 
social/informational neighborhood) if they can increase their utility by so doing. In 
intuitive terms, polarization can occur because agents can typically increase their utility 
by moving to parts of the network where the agents have similar attitudes to their own. 
This utility increase occurs because inhabiting a more congenial neighborhood allows 
agents to express behaviors that are closer to their own private attitudes—thereby gaining 
authenticity—without suffering too much disutility from social extremeness.7  
                                               
7 Recall that the network structure is not necessarily based on physical 
topography. Hence agents can increase their utility by choosing to pay more attention to 
arguments or individuals’ views that are more consistent with their own — i.e., the same 
mechanism can operate though attention to particular political blogs or media outlets 
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For example, consider again relatively liberal Alison (Figure 1). It is evident from 
the expressed attitudes of her network neighbors that she inhabits a fairly conservative 
neighborhood. As a result of her location, and of her social extremeness aversion, she 
loses utility because her authenticity preference cannot be well satisfied if she is to avoid 
being socially extreme. Suppose that, in a different and more liberal local neighborhood 
within another part of the network, Alison has a Republican counterpart— Adam. 
Adam’s situation is the complement of Alison’s; assuming that Adam is also sensitive to 
social extremeness, he will be expressing a more moderate viewpoint in his liberal milieu 
than he would if he cared only about his authenticity preference, and is thereby losing 
authenticity-related utility. Imagine however how the situation would change if Adam 
and Alison were able to exchange network locations. The utility of both of them would 
improve. Alison’s utility-maximizing Ai will move to the left, because she can now 
express something more consistent with her private attitude without being so socially 
extreme. Her utility will increase overall, because her authenticity preference will be 
better met. Adam’s utility will also improve, because in his new more conservative 
neigborhood he can also express an attitude more consistent with his own private attitude 
and will thereby increase his authenticity-related utility. Thus both Alison and Adam will 
have an incentive to move to the other’s location, as they will both increase their utility 
by doing so (see Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter, & Nosek, 2014, for evidence of such 
behavior). This provides an account of homophily based on utility maximization, 
quantifying a rational tendency for “birds of a feather to flock together”. We expect it to 
lead both to segregation and to polarization, when polarization is measured in terms of 
expressed attitudes. The polarization occurs because agents with extreme views will, if 
they are initially located in a random position in the network, on average initially be 
surrounded by more moderate neighbors and hence will moderate their expressed 
attitudes. After segregation, these agents will express more extreme attitudes of the 
reasons just described.  
                                               




We simulate a network of 100 ×100 agents. The simulation involves the following 
steps. At the start of the simulation each agent is endowed with their own private attitude. 
This requires specifying both an a and a b parameter for each agent, and proceeds as 
follows. First, each agent is allocated a mean private attitude, specified to two decimal 
places, drawn from the distribution beta(10,10), such that moderate attitudes are more 
common than extreme attitudes. (Using a beta distribution to generate the private 
attitudes ensures that all lie between 0 and 1.) Beta(10,10) is qualitatively similar to a 
normal distribution; 63% of the values lie between .4 and .6, and 99% lie between .2 
and .8. Each agent is then given the a and b parameters that corresponded to their mean 
private attitude; this leads to a reasonable distribution of initial attitudes with a variety of 
precisions. For example, if an agent’s private attitude were .43, it would be assigned a = 
43 and b = (100-43) = 57. If an agent’s private attitude were .60, it would be assigned a = 
3 and b = (5-3) = 2. The smallest integers that gave the required private attitude were 
used. Thus each agent’s private attitude is given by their [a ,b] pair; these private 
attitudes remained constant throughout each simulation reported below except where 
explicitly mentioned (Demonstrations S2 and S3).  
The remaining actions happen on each of many successive cycles of the 
simulation. In general terms, during each cycle each agent updates their Ai on the basis of 
the change in expressed attitudes arising on the previous cycle. First, each agent looks at 
the eight-element vector representing the expressed attitudes of its neighbors. Each agent 
then fits a beta distribution to that vector, and the estimated parameters of this beta 
distribution specify the social norm for that agent.8 Here and throughout a and b values 
for inferred social norms are constrained to sum to a maximum of 20; this sets a limit on 
the precision with which social norms may be represented cognitively and avoids 
pathological behavior that may otherwise arise if representations of social norms become 
too narrow and converge towards single points. 
Second, each agent calculates the utility-maximizing attitude for it to express, 
given its (invariant) private attitude and its perception of the social norm. This is done by 
simulation, using Equation 4 above, and works as described in the previous sections. The 
                                               
8 In the simulation, this was done using the MATLAB command betafit. 
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expressed attitude of every agent, Ai, is then updated to be that agent’s maximum-utility 
expressed attitude. This updated value becomes the attitude that is observed by the 
agent’s network neighbors on the next time step. 
Third, the mechanism through which agents may move locations is specified. The 
mechanism was deliberately kept as simple as possible; no intelligent searching of 
locations by agents is assumed. On each time cycle of the simulation, after a run-in period 
of two cycles which allows expressed attitudes to stabilize, two agents are chosen at 
random. Each of the two agents that have been selected looks at the neighborhood of the 
other agent and calculates the maximum-utility expressed attitude it would express if it 
were in the alternate location. It then compares the total utility it is experiencing in its 
current location with the total utility it would experience if it were in the other location. If 
and only if both of the randomly-chosen agents could improve their utility by switching 
to the other agent’s network location, the two agents exchange places. Otherwise, no 
switch takes place and another two agents are chosen at random until a utility-improving 
change is made. The simulation continues to the next cycle when one and only one 
exchange has been made and when agents’ expressed attitudes have been updated to 
reflect the switch.9 
Thus the decision of agents to move to a particular region of the network could be 
interpreted psychologically as a choice to pay selective attention to (i.e., to expose 
oneself to) the attitudes expressed in that neighborhood, e.g., through a particular set of 
media. Alternatively, and equivalently from the perspective of our network topography, it 
could represent a decision to spend more time socially with agents expressing a particular 
set of viewpoints. 
 We focused on two aspects of the network’s behavior: segregation and 
polarization. We allowed the network, with parameters w = .5 and g = 20 as in the 
examples discussed above, to run for 50,000 cycles. Figure 11 shows the distribution of 
attitudes across the network as it evolves over time. The shading of the squares represents 
the expressed attitude of the agent in the square, with white representing an agent 
                                               
9 To reduce simulation time, only the attitudes of agents whose neighbors have changed 
are updated following a switch.	
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expressing an extreme left-wing attitude (.2) and black representing an agent expressing 
an extreme right-wing attitude (.8).10 The four panels of the Figure show the state of the 
network after 3, 4000, 20000 and 50000 cycles. (Although these numbers may seem 
unrealistically large, only two of the 10,000 simulated agents change locations on each 
cycle of the simulation. This implementation is adopted to preserve transparency given 
complications that ensue when agents make movement decisions based on non-updated 
environments. In reality, multiple agents would likely change locations simultaneously 
and hence the number of cycles should not be taken as representative of real time; even if 
only 20% of agents change location on each time cycle the network reaches equilibrium 
in a relatively small number of simulated time steps.) 
Over time the network gradually segregates, such that clusters of agents with 
similar attitudes come to populate particular regions of the network. Agents choose to 
favor sources of information consistent with their own, and hence prefer to surround 
themselves by individuals whose views are consistent with their own. This enables agents 
to maximize their utility, as they are thereby able to express attitudes closer to their true 
attitudes without suffering too much social extremeness. This mechanism offers a 
quantitative explanation for why rational agents, each with an authenticity preference and 
an aversion to social extremeness, would tend to flock together.  
The fact that segregated clusters can emerge in social networks due to the 
operation of simple rules for homophily has long been known. The novel aspect of the 
present approach is the adoption of a cognitively plausible mechanism for rational utility 
maximization based on a preference for avoiding social extremity, and examination of the 
resulting polarization to which we now turn. 
Of particular interest are the effects of gradual segregation in the network on the 
distribution of expressed attitudes across the entire population. The right-hand panel of 
Figure 12 shows how the variance in attitudes across the network changes over time. 
Variance increases as segregation occurs, reflecting the fact that agents with relatively 
extreme private attitudes are able to express more extreme attitudes after they have 
                                               
10 A color movie showing the emergence of polarization in the network over time is 
available at http://bit.ly/2qCR9tG . 
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moved to clusters of others with similar attitudes. The left-hand panel of Figure 12 shows 
the evolution over time of the average expressed attitudes of the most extreme 5%, 20% 
and 40% of the population at either end of the attitude distribution (the lines with the 
highest and lowest values show the average of the 5% most conservative and 5% most 
liberal agents, defined in terms of their expressed not underlying attitudes; the lines with 
values closest to .5 show the equivalent 40% values). At the beginning of the simulation, 
when no segregation has occurred, expressed attitudes of these agents are drawn towards 
the middle of the distribution. With increasing segregation, however, agents are 
increasingly likely to have found a location in the network where they can be surrounded 
by relatively congenial neighbors and are hence able to express more extreme attitudes. 
The same is true, to a lesser extent, for agents at less extreme percentiles of the 
distribution of expressed attitudes. 
To illustrate the behavior of the model in more detail and explore the robustness 
of its behavior, we examined the amount of polarization that occurs for different values of 
the social comparison parameter w. It was expected that increased social comparison 
would lead to the emergence of more polarization, and this is what was found. Figure 13 
shows the distribution of mean expressed attitudes at the end of the 50,000 cycles of the 
simulation for different values of w (.01, .30, .70, and .99). For comparison, each panel 
also shows the distribution of mean expressed attitudes at the end of the first cycle of the 
simulation. Two key effects are evident. First, after the first cycle of the simulation (i.e., 
before any agents have had the opportunity to move to more congenial neighborhoods 
and hence express more extreme attitudes) social comparison leads to a convergence of 
expressed attitudes. This convergence is greater when the social comparison parameter w 
takes a higher value, and reflects the movement of each agent’s expressed attitude 
towards the median of that agent’s social neighborhood. Second, by the end of the 
simulation, more polarization (a flatter distribution of expressed attitudes) is seen when 
social comparison is greater. This is because movement into neighborhoods where the 
social norm aligns with a private attitude has more effect when social comparison is high 
(if there were no social comparison, i.e., w = 0, there would be no effect of social 
neighborhood on expressed attitudes whether or not agents changed their locations). 
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As a robustness check, we examined the extent of polarization under various 
different parameter combinations. Specifically, we varied g (values between 5 and 50), w 
(values between .01 and .99) and the a and b parameters that characterize the initial 
distributions of attitudes (values between 3 and 30).  For each combination of parameters, 
we calculated total disutility (summed across all agents; see Demonstration 2.2 below) at 
the end of the simulation, and the degree of polarization that emerged (measured as the 
ratio of the variance in mean attitudes at the end of polarization to the variance in mean 
attitudes before any polarization occurs). 20 replications of the simulation were 
conducted for each set of parameter values to examine the consistency of results.  
The results are shown in Table 2. It is evident from the low standard deviations 
that similar results were obtained over the 20 replications for each parameter 
combination.  Polarization was observed under all parameter value combinations, but did 
not vary greatly for different parameter values with the exception of the large effect of w; 
higher values of w lead to greater polarization (as also shown in Figure 13 and discussed 
in that context). 
We also examined robustness of the polarization to changes in the functional form 
relating disutility to extremeness (Equation 3). The results are described in S4 (in 
Supplementary Online Material),  and were very similar to those obtained with the 
standard (convex) function.  
Demonstration 2.2: Aggregate network well-being. A consequence of 
polarization is that the average well-being in the network will increase gradually over 
time as segregation and polarization occur (i.e., disutility will reduce). This is because 
agents lose less authenticity-related utility as they move and become less constrained (by 
social extremeness aversion) to express a less authentic attitude. The effect is illustrated 
in Figure 14, which shows the reduction in total network disutility over time as 
polarization occurs (same parameters as first simulation above).11 As shown in Table 2, 
the disutility reduction is robust across a range of parameter values, although the absolute 
amount inevitably depends on parameter selection. 
                                               
11 There are of course many possible negative societal consequences of polarization as 
well; these lie outside the scope of the present paper. 
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Demonstration 2.3: Social contagion effects. Next, we examine the conditions 
under which attitudes expressed by a single agent can spread through networks. There is a 
large literature, spread across many disciplines, on the effects that zealots or committed 
minorities can have on wider opinion (e.g., Masuda, 2012; Moscovici, 1980; Verma, 
Swami, & Chan, 2014); our aim here is to show how and when mechanisms may give 
rise to such effects. 
In this simulation the network structure remains the same as in previous 
simulations, as do the principles governing the behavior of each agent within the network. 
We use a smaller (20 X 20) network, because each simulation takes a long time to run 
and the spread of attitudes is no better explained by larger networks. As before, each 
agent observes the expressed attitudes of its immediate neighbors on each time cycle, and 
on the basis of those attitudes and its own randomly-selected fixed private attitude the 
agent expresses its utility-maximizing attitude. However, unlike in previous simulations, 
agents never change position and hence the network stabilises after only a few cycles. On 
the tenth cycle, however, we place a single new agent into a random location in the 
network. This agent (the “seeded agent”) differs from other agents in two ways. First, it is 
endowed with an extreme attitude (.99). Second, it is a “stubborn agent” (Acemoglu & 
Ozdaglar, 2011) and is immune to social norms; it expresses the same attitude of .99 on 
every cycle of the network no matter what attitudes are being expressed by its neighbors.  
The question of interest is whether — and under what conditions — the expressed 
attitude of the seeded agent’s neighbors will spread throughout the network, influencing 
first its immediate neighbors, then the neighbors of those neighbors, and so on. To 
illustrate as simply as possible, we set w = .8 for all agents (except the agent that is 
seeded into the network, for which w = 0), and varied g. Initial endowment of private 
attitudes was as in previous simulations.  
Results are illustrated in Figure 15. Three qualitatively different patterns of 
behavior are seen, corresponding to different values of g. When g is small (less than ≅ .5; 
top two rows of panels), strong social contagion occurs. The expression of the extreme 
attitude propagates through the network, spreading outwards from the seeded agent until 
eventually every agent in the entire network is expressing the same, extreme, attitude. 
When g is around 6, however, social contagion occurs but is limited in extent: Only 
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agents in the immediate social neighborhood of the seeded agent are influenced in the 
direction of expressing a more extreme attitude, and the effect is diminished as the social 
distance from the seeded agent increases. This pattern is illustrated in the third row of 
panels in Figure 15. Finally, as g becomes larger (e.g. 20), no social contagion occurs.12 
Why does g influence social contagion? Recall that g governs the rate at which 
disutility increases as authenticity is lost and social extremeness increases (Figure 4A and 
Equation 3). The higher the value of g, the more extreme an expressed attitude must be to 
give rise to significant disutility. For example, when g = 4, 50% of the maximum possible 
disutility related to social extremeness occurs when an expressed attitude is at about the 
83rd percentile of the social norm, and 80% of the maximum possible disutility occurs 
when an expressed attitude is at about the 94th percentile of the social norm. When g = 
20, in contrast, expressed attitudes must be at about the 96th and 99th percentiles of the 
social norm to attract the same amounts of disutility. In other words, the greater the value 
of g, the more tolerant agents are of a given level of social extremism. Specifically, the 
effect of the seeded agent’s extreme opinion on its neighbors’ estimates of how socially 
extreme they are will be independent of gamma. However, if g is low, the effect of those 
estimates on the attitudes that are utility-maximizing for an agent to express is greater. 
The greater the effect on immediate neighbors, the greater the effect on the neighbors of 
those neighbors, and so on. It is useful to consider the limiting case: When g reduces to 
zero, agents will incur the maximum extremeness-related disutility whenever they 
express an attitude that is anything except the exact median of the social norm (see 
Equation 3). 
Demonstration 2.4: False consensus effects. An important factor relating to 
social norms and polarization is the perception of one’s immediate social environment 
(Galesic et al., 2012; Galesic, Olsson, & Rieskamp, 2013; Galesic et al., 2018; Pachur et 
al., 2013; Schulze et al., 2020). People typically overestimate the prevalence of their own 
opinion in a population — this is the false consensus effect (e.g., Leviston, Walker, & 
                                               
12 Color movies showing social contagion, as well as its absence under different 
parameter values, in the network over time are available at http://bit.ly/2pkCcsj and 
http://bit.ly/2tg68rP .  
SOCIAL	SAMPLING	THEORY	 38	
Morwinski, 2013; Marks & Miller, 1987; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), with the effect 
being stronger for people who hold minority opinions (Krueger & Clement, 1997).  
We examined the emergence of false consensus as polarization occurs. We 
assume that agents estimate the opinion of other agents by taking the mean of the social 
norm that they have estimated on the basis of the attitudes expressed by their eight 
immediate network neighbors. As segregation occurs, these neighborhood means will 
tend to converge towards the opinions of the estimating agent. Figure 16 plots the simple 
correlation between the mean expressed attitudes of each agent’s neighbors and that 
agent’s expressed (solid line) and private (broken line) attitudes. As expected, the 
correlations increase as the simulation progresses and segregation occurs. This occurs 
because each agent gradually locates itself within a neighborhood of similar others, hence 
(by design) increasing the similarity between its own attitudes and the expressed attitudes 
of immediate neighbors.  
Thus false consensus effects fall naturally out of SST (although we note the 
existence of several alternative explanations: Galesic et al., 2013, 2018; Marks & Miller, 
1987). In SST, false consensus effects will arise whenever segregation occurs and people 
over-sample from local regions of their social networks when estimating population 
attitudes. For robustness, we examined the effects of parameter variation on the 
emergence of false consensus effects. As shown in Table 2, false consensus effects occur 
under all combinations of parameter values that we examined. 
 Demonstration 2.5: Pluralistic ignorance effects. A counterpart to the false 
consensus effect is pluralistic ignorance — pluralistic ignorance is typically said to be 
present when individuals holding the majority opinion incorrectly believe themselves to 
be in a minority (e.g., Prentice & Miller, 1993; Shamir & Shamir, 1997). For example, 
Todorov and Mandisodza (Todorov & Mandisodza, 2004) found that American citizens 
mostly preferred multilateral foreign policies but that many of them incorrectly believed 
that a majority of others supported unilateralist approaches. A related phenomenon is the 
false uniqueness effect, which occurs when people believe that their own view is less 
widespread than it actually is (Frable, 1993).  
In SST pluralistic ignorance occurs under similar conditions to those that produce 
strong social contagion. We illustrate by endowing agents with an asymmetric 
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distribution of private attitudes. Specifically, we create a population whose mean private 
attitudes are drawn from the distribution beta(8,10) instead of the symmetrical 
distribution beta(10,10) used in earlier simulations. As a result about 70% of agents have 
private opinions with mean <.5, and “mean >.5” is therefore the minority opinion. We 
assume, as we did when illustrating the false consensus effect, that agents estimate the 
opinions of the entire populations by sampling from their local neighborhood. 
Specifically, on each time cycle of the simulation each agent counts up the proportion of 
their eight network neighbors who are expressing a view > .5, and uses that proportion as 
an estimate of the population proportion.  
As with our contagion simulations, on the tenth time cycle of the simulation we 
introduce one agent with a fixed expressed view (.99), which in this case corresponds to 
the minority opinion. As this agent’s extreme opinion gradually spreads through the 
social network, an increasing number of the other agents become surrounded by 
neighbors expressing an opinion > .5 and their estimate of the proportion of the 
population holding such an opinion increases. The process is illustrated in Figure 17, 
which was obtained with g = 1 and w = .9. The vertical axis shows the average of agents’ 
estimates, based on the attitudes expressed by their local neighbors, of the proportion of 
the population holding an opinion > .5. The horizontal line represents the (unchanging) 
proportion of agents in the network whose mean private attitudes are actually > .5.  
In the initial few cycles of the simulation the expressed views of most agents 
move towards the majority (<.5) opinion. On the tenth cycle the agent with an extreme 
view is introduced, and consequently that agent’s neighbors and then the neighbors of 
those neighbors gradually come to express views > .5 themselves even if their private 
views are < .5. As the proportion of agents expressing >.5 increases, the average estimate 
of that proportion increases and with parameters that lead to complete social contagion 
(see Figure 15) eventually reaches 1.0. Thus all the agents privately holding what is in 
fact the majority view (i.e., <.5) eventually come to believe that all other agents hold the 
opposite view (i.e., >.5), because that opposite view is what neighboring agents have 
come (due to social pressure) to express (cf. Kuran, 1995). The simulation therefore 
illustrates one way in which pluralistic ignorance may occur in SST. 
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In additional simulations (reported as S3 in Supplementary Online Material) we 
extend this approach by investigating the effects of exposing every agent, on every time 
cycle, to a consistent set of opinions expressed by other agents. These consistent opinions 
can be thought of as those represented in media sources or by political leaders (Bail et al., 
2018). The simulations show, consistent with intuition, that both private and expressed 
attitudes converge towards those expressed by the consistent agents whose attitudes are 
seen by everybody. 
General Discussion 
 SST joins a large set of models that have sought to explain various aspects of 
polarization, social influence, and opinion formation in social networks (for reviews, see, 
e.g., Acemoglu & Ozdaglar, 2011; Lehmann & Ahn, 2018; MacCoun, 2017). We have 
already noted social sampling models (e.g., Galesic et al., 2012, 2018; Pachur et al., 
2013) and agent-based models focussing specifically on polarization (e.g., Flache & 
Macy, 2011b; Latan & Wolf, 1981; Nowak et al., 1990). There are many other models of 
polarization from various disciplines (e.g., Andreoni & Mylovanov, 2012; Baumann, 
Lorenz-Spreen, Sokolov, & Starnini, 2020, 2021; Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Jern et 
al., 2014) as well as models of how media  coverage may be influenced by polarization  
(Bernhardt, Krasa, & Polborn, 2008). Numerous relevant models of social influence and 
opinion spread have also been developed in other disciplines, such as economics 
(Akerlof, 1980; Bernheim, 1994; Chamley, 2003; Jones, 1984), sociology (Friedkin & 
Johnsen, 2011), ecology (Bentley, Ormerod, et al., 2011), marketing (Iyengar, Van den 
Bulte, & Valente, 2011; Rao & Steckel, 1991), and the study of complex systems 
(Deffuant, Neau, Amblard, & Weisbuch, 2000; House, 2011; Sznajd-Weron & Sznajd, 
2000). We have not been able to do justice to these or to a large literature on the 
psychological principles underlying the spread of mass opinion (e.g., Zaller, 1992). Given 
that space limitations preclude a comprehensive review, here we first delineate the 
features of SST that distinguish it from other models and summarize how those features 
give rise to its behavior, then discuss predictions, limitations and possible extensions, and 
implications.  
 
Key Distinctive Features of SST 
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 Social extremeness aversion and authenticity preference. Most of the 
properties of SST emerge as a result of the interaction between two opposing factors: 
social extremeness aversion and authenticity preference. Any model of polarization must 
explain both (a) the continued existence of individual differences — networks do not 
always converge to homogeneity, and (b) the tendency of expressed attitudes to become 
more extreme when agents are able to choose their social or informational neighborhoods 
(Abelson & Bernstein, 1963). Although these are distinct phenomena, in SST authenticity 
preferences (together with individual differences in private attitudes) underlie both. It is 
the authenticity preference that prevents the network from converging to homogeneity 
and allows differences in attitudes to persist in the face of social influence, while SST’s 
social extremeness aversion leads to homophily and polarization. In this respect SST 
differs from models that ascribe polarization to a preference for, or selective influence by, 
extremeness (Abelson & Bernstein, 1963).  
We have remained neutral on the underlying reasons for the existence of social 
extremeness aversion; there are many (non-exclusive) plausible distal causes of 
conformity (e.g., Kelman, 1958). However we note particularly that, in addition to 
supporting coordination, social conformity may be adaptive when others have 
information that the conforming agent does not (Bentley, Earls, & O'Brien, 2011; 
Chamley, 2003) rather than simply reflecting a taste for conformity per se (Deutsch & 
Gerard, 1955). In one interpretation of SST, therefore, (a) people have uncertainty about 
their private attitudes, which can be seen as a type of preferences, (b) they assume that 
they are similar to other people, as false consensus effects suggest, and (c) they assume 
that the “market” of expressed attitudes in their social environment reflects the aggregate 
private attitudes of the population. Effects of social norms can then be interpreted as part 
of the process of inferring one’s own attitudes from a combination of an uncertain private 
signal and the expressed attitudes of (assumed similar) others who are assumed to have 
additional sources of information. 
We note a possible relationship between the ideas presented here and the concept 
of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1954). According to cognitive dissonance theory, 
inconsistency between actions and attitudes is negative for well-being, and people are 
motivated to reduce the discrepancy between them. If we interpret the expression of 
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attitudes as the “actions” of cognitive dissonance theory, and the “attitudes” of cognitive 
dissonance theory map onto the private rather than the expressed attitudes of SST, our 
proposal can be seen as a simple implementation of cognitive dissonance. However we 
differ from, e.g., Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) in emphasizing the role of social norms, 
rather than compliance induced by other means, in leading to expressed attitudes that 
differ from those that are more “authentic”,  and we also note that dissonance theories 
typically (but unlike SST) assume conscious awareness of discrepancies between 
attitudes and behaviors. 
We also note that the processes specified in SST may underpin one form of 
“deliberate ignorance” (Golman et al., 2017; Hertwig & Engel, 2016) in that people’s 
authenticity preferences may motivate their avoidance of individuals (or other sources of 
information) who espouse, or otherwise represent, attitudes incongruent with one’s own. 
Authenticity preference  can also be seen as underpinning preferences for belief  
consonance  (Golman, Loewenstein, Moene, & Zarri, 2016) and maintenance of a 
consistent identity (Bénabou & Tirole, 2011; Golman et al., 2017).  
 Attitudes are distributions. Attitudes are represented as distributions, not single 
points, in SST to reflect the fact that any given attitude may be more or less precise. The 
attitudes-as-distributions assumption is central to SST as it underlies its ability to account 
for the effect of attitude precision on social norm effects and backfire effects; a person 
whose attitude precision is high will be less influenced by social norms, and is more 
likely to show backfire effects, because the cost they suffer (in terms of authenticity loss) 
of conforming is higher for a given amount of conformity. In its emphasis on 
distributional representations of attitudes SST therefore goes beyond models which 
represent opinions as binary (e.g., Nowak et al., 1990) or as single points on a continuum 
(e.g., Dittmer, 2001). The key claim is that the distributional properties of attitudes must 
be represented in some way; we make no claim that our specific implementation (using 
beta distributions) is the only way this could be done.  
The claim that attitudes are distributions is not the same as the claim that attitudes 
are noisy or uncertain; people may occupy the same ideological position but differ in how 
committed they are to that position – informally, they may differ simply in how strong 
their preference for a given position is. The claim that attitudes are distributions is also 
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different from the idea that there are differences in attitude-related “awareness” as 
defined by Zaller (1992), in the context of political attitudes, in terms of the amount of  
attention to and understanding of relevant issues. The claim is also distinct from the 
notion of an attitude’s “importance” to satisfaction or value achievement (Rosenberg, 
1956) and in addition differs from the idea that binary attitudes might differ in the 
strength with which they are held (e.g., Bassili, 1996). 
Social norms are distributions. SST assumes that social norms, like attitudes, 
are best viewed as distributions. The estimation of  social norms, as it occurs in SST, can 
be seen as a normative estimation of public attitudes given a sample. This assumption that 
the social norm is a distribution distinguishes the approach from a number of models in 
economics, health psychology, and consumer science, which typically assume that norms 
can be represented as single points such as a typical wage, reference, price, weight, or 
level of alcohol consumption. As with the assumption that attitudes are distributions, the 
treatment of social norms as distributions rather than single points is central to the 
behavior of SST. This is because the assumption allows for effects of consensus in the 
social norm — a person will need to conform more in the direction of a social norm to 
achieve a given reduction of social extremeness aversion when there is high consensus in 
the social norm (i.e., when the estimated social norm has high precision). Moreover, 
backfire effects can emerge when social consensus is high. Neither of these effects would 
emerge in SST without the assumption that social norms are distributions, not single 
points.  
 Concern with relative rank. Another key distinguishing feature of SST — 
closely related to its distributional assumptions — is that people care about where they 
rank within a social distribution rather than how they relate to the mean of that 
distribution. As noted earlier, a large body of empirical work on people’s judgments of 
quantities such as their exercise levels, alcohol consumption, etc., supports this 
assumption and the claim is also consistent with rank-based sampling models of 
judgment and decision-making (Bhui & Gershman, 2018; Stewart et al., 2006).  
 Distinction between private attitudes and expressed attitudes. The distinction 
between private attitudes (which in most demonstrations above are assumed to be fixed 
and unchanging characteristics of an individual) on the one hand, and expressed attitudes 
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(which can change as a function of social context) on the other, underpins much of SST’s 
behavior and can be seen as both a strength and a weakness. The existence of fixed 
individual characteristics is consistent with the idea that some individual differences in 
values (e.g., ideology) are relatively stable characteristics of a person over their lifetime. 
The assumption offers one explanation for why social norm effects do not cause people’s 
attitudes to converge over time and eventually become identical; the fixed private 
attitudes provide an essential “opposing force” which counteracts effects of social norms. 
SST’s explanation of why areas of non-convergent opinions may survive contrasts with 
others that have been given in terms of network structure and noise (e.g., DiFonzo et al., 
2013; Maes, Flache, & Helbing, 2010). We also note that our conception of private 
attitudes resonates with the concept of “attitude roots” developed by Hornsey and 
Fielding (2017), and that the assumption of both (assumed stable) private attitudes and 
(socially influenced and context-dependent) public expressions of attitudes relates to a 
long-standing debate about the stability of political attitudes (Converse, 1964; Diener, 
1975; Zaller, 1992). A distinction between private and expressed preferences can also be 
found in voting models (Gastner, Oborny, & Gulyas, 2018; Masuda, Gibert, & Redner, 
2010). 
 We do not assume that agents have direct and privileged access to their own 
private attitudes. Instead we regard SST as one possible implementation of the idea that 
people infer their attitudes from their own overt behavior (Bem, 1967; Wilson, 2002) (cf. 
also Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). However, the operation of SST as we have presented here 
does not hinge on whether or not private attitudes are accessible to conscious awareness. 
There is in any case a need to distinguish between, on the one hand, cases where one 
explicitly conforms in the sense of expressing or assenting to views that one knows one 
does not truly hold , as in “preference falisfication” (Kuran, 1995), and on the other hand 
cases where one genuinely believes oneself to be holding the view that one expresses 
notwithstanding the fact that one might have believed oneself to hold a different view if 
circumstances were otherwise. Thus a complete model will likely need to distinguish 
between (a) private/authentic/underlying attitudes, which are only indirectly accessible to 
awareness, (b) inferred attitudes, which are what people believe their 
private/authentic/underlying attitudes to be, and (c) expressed attitudes, which are 
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reflected in overt behavior and are observable by others. The mechanisms describe in the 
present paper could therefore be seen as reflecting the informational role of social norms 
(whereby an individual’s beliefs about their own attitudes are informed by observation of 
others’ attitudes), and/or as an account of the social conformity that causes a person’s 
expressed attitudes to differ from their attitudinal beliefs.  
Double-peaked preferences. Unlike most models within economics and political 
science, SST allows for the possibility of double-peaked preferences. This can occur 
when the utilities associated with expressing either one’s authentic attitude, or 
conforming to the social norm, both exceed the utility associated with expressing a 
compromise attitude. To motivate the intuition (albeit with an example concerned with 
beliefs rather than attitudes) consider participating in a social conformity experiment 
(Asch, 1956) in which one must report whether the length of a line is 1 m or 3 m. One’s 
own perceptions indicate strongly that the line is 1 m long, but the other participants in 
the experiment all report that it is 3 m long. In such a situation there is little to be gained 
by compromising and suggesting that the line is 2 m long; rather, locally utility maxima 
correspond to being true to one’s own beliefs (and reporting 1 m) or conforming 
completely (reporting 3 m). The possibility of double-peaked preferences is responsible 
for some of the sudden changes in expressed attitude in SST; these occur when one peak 
suddenly becomes higher than the other leading to a sudden switch in expressed behavior 
as a function of a smoothly-varying parameter (see Demonstration 1.3).  
 
Predictions  
Our aim has been to (a) account for a range of existing phenomena with as simple 
a model as possible, while (b) using basic building blocks that are independently 
motivated by evidence from relevant areas of psychology. But is SST falsifiable? In this 
section we summarize novel predictions from the model, along with suggestions for how 
they might be tested in future work. Predictions fall into two categories. On the one hand, 
as we have illustrated throughout, SST makes predictions about how particular effects 
will vary as a function of parameter values (see, e.g., Table 2). An important issue is 
therefore the feasibility of measuring individual differences in those parameter values, 
and we address that issue here. Other SST-specific predictions result from the aspects of 
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the model architecture that distinguish it from most previous models as outlined in the 
previous section and we therefore organise this section in similar fashion. 
Predictions that most clearly distinguish SST from other models arise from its 
assumptions that both attitudes and social norms are represented as distributions rather 
than single points, and that the width of these distributions matters for behavior. At the 
most general level, these assumptions lead to the idea that the feelings of authenticity or 
social extremeness associated with expression of a particular attitude will depend not on 
the distance of the expressed attitude from a social norm or authentic attitude that is 
represented by a single-point, but rather by the position of the expressed attitude within 
the relevant distribution. Thus SST predicts that narrower (more precise) representations 
of attitudes and social norms will lead to the expression of attitudes that are closer to the 
medians of the distributions representing private attitudes and social norms respectively, 
but are also predicted to be more susceptible to backfire effects (see Demonstration 1.3).  
Can the locations and precisions of private attitudes and perceptions of social norms be 
measured? In the case of perceptions of social norms, relevant methodology already 
exists. In a number of previous studies, we have shown how people’s beliefs about social 
norm distributions (of, for example, exercise levels or the consumption of alcohol or 
unhealthy food) can be elicited by asking people to estimate percentile points of the 
relevant social distributions (Aldrovandi, Brown, et al., 2015; Maltby et al., 2012; A. M. 
Wood et al., 2012). Given this knowledge of an individual’s beliefs about the social 
norm, it should be possible to predict how a person’s expressed attitude will change as 
their beliefs about the social norm (which may be incorrect due to sampling bias), and 
hence the position they believe their expressed attitudes to occupy within that 
distribution, are changed. Related experiments have already been reported in other 
domains. For example, telling people their true relative ranked position in the social norm 
of unhealthy food consumption increases the premium they are prepared to pay for a 
healthier food option by an amount that depends on the initial degree of people’s 
misperception of their relative ranked position within the social norm (Aldrovandi, 
Brown, et al., 2015), and telling people where their level of alcohol consumption ranks 
within the social norm increases relevant information searching more than does telling 
them how their consumption relates to the mean of the social norm (Taylor et al., 2015). 
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Similar methodologies may be applied to test SST’s predictions regarding the expression 
of attitudes more generally.  
The measurement of private attitudes is more difficult, given SST’s assumption 
that overt behavior reflects expressed rather than private attitudes. There is already a 
large literature on the measurement of implicit attitudes, and on the ability of such 
measures to predict behavior over and above measures of explicit attitudes (see, e.g., 
Schimmack, 2019, for a review). Psychophysiological measures might also hold 
potential, as might reaction time measures (Bassili, 1996). However there are important 
differences between the private attitudes of SST and implicit and/or unconscious attitudes 
as typically conceived of. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the precision of implicit 
attitudes can be assessed. In the light of these considerations we view the distributions 
that represent private attitudes as theoretical quantities that can be inferred but not 
measured directly.  
Another set of predictions concerns the relative importance of authenticity 
preference and social extremeness aversion. SST predicts that agents with stronger 
authenticity preference and/or weaker social extremeness aversion should be more 
susceptible to polarization. Measures of different components of authenticity already 
exist (A. M. Wood et al., 2008), with one component being “accepting external 
influence”, although measures of authenticity are of course conceptually distinct from 
measures of authenticity preference (one could be inauthentic but wish to be authentic). 
However it seems reasonable to assume that people are authentic because it is important 
to them to be so, in which case SST would predict that high-authenticity individuals will 
be less susceptible to social influence in general and polarization in particular.  
Further predictions arise from the claims that SST makes regarding well-being. 
Granted the assumption that subjective well-being (i.e., self-reported life satisfaction or 
positive and negative affect) will in part reflect discrepancies between expressed attitudes 
and both private attitudes and the social norm, it should be possible to predict subjective 
well-being from the discrepancy between expressed attitudes and the perceived social 
norm (which can be elicited as described above). Specifically, SST predicts a negative 
association between subjective well-being and the distance (in rank space) between an 
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attitude that an individual expresses and the median of the social norm that the individual 
believes to obtain. 
We also highlight distinctive predictions arising from the possibility of double-
peaked functions describing the utility associated with expressing particular attitudes. In 
SST, double-peaked functions occur when it is worse for an agent to express a 
compromise attitude than to express attitudes closer to the medians of the distributions 
representing their authentic attitudes and the social norm. Double peaks (and backfire 
effects) are more likely to occur in SST to the extent that (a) there is a large difference 
between the medians of the two distributions, and (b) the distributions are precise. It 
should in principle be possible to test this prediction by eliciting the attitudes people 
prefer to express while varying a hypothetical social norm.  
A final class of predictions concerns ease of transmission of attitude-congruent 
and attitude-incongruent messages through social networks. There is already a large body 
of research on how the transmission of both information and misinformation through 
social networks depends on the features of the message such as its novelty (e.g., 
Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018). One key prediction of SST is that (other things, such as 
network structure, being equal) messages that are congruent with private attitudes will be 
transmitted from one agent to the next, and onward throughout the network, with less 
distortion than attitude-incongruent messages. This is because agents will under most 
circumstances transmit to neighboring agents a message (i.e., an expressed attitude) that 
is closer to their private attitude than was the message they received.  
 
Limitations and extensions. 
 Network structure. The simple network architecture that we have adopted, in 
which all agents see and are influenced by all and only their eight immediate neighbors, 
is clearly unrealistic as a model of actual social structure. In reality, a few people have a 
large number of social network connections while most have few (Fowler, Dawes, & 
Christakis, 2009), and “small world” networks also contain a proportion of long-distance 
connections (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). Thus the assumption that all agents are connected 
to the same number of other agents represents a considerable simplification of the 
structure of real social networks (Albert & Barabasi, 2002; Barabasi, 2009). We also 
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acknowledge the fact that features such as long-range connections may influence network 
behavior in ways relevant to social phenomena such as polarization (e.g., Flache & Macy, 
2011a). We believe that the simple network structure we have used enables the best and 
least obscured illustration of the operation and consequences of the psychological 
processes embodied in the model. However it is important to acknowledge that that 
network structure can make a difference to a number of network-level social phenomena 
(such as the spread of innovations: Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997). Opinions, like 
behavior, spread differently in different network structures (e.g., Centola, 2010), and 
structure also influences the formation of echo chambers (e.g., Madsen, Bailey, & 
Pilditch, 2018) and the transmission of extreme opinions (e.g., Amblard & Deffuant, 
2004; Franks, Noble, Kaufmann, & Stagl, 2008). The size of the local neighborhood is 
also important (e.g., MacCoun, 2012). SST does not distinguish between “strong ties” 
and “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973), and this distinction may be relevant to 
understanding polarization (Flache & Macy, 2011b). An important task for further work 
is therefore to integrate the core mechanisms of SST into models of network formation. 
In initial work along these lines, we13 have started to examine the consequences for the 
development of network structure of assumptions concerning the formation and deletion 
of edges between individual agents as a function of the discrepancy between private 
attitudes and expressed attitudes. As intuition (and much previous research) suggests, the 
incorporation of such assumptions into models of network formation leads to the creation 
of subgroups of like-minded agents and to the emergence of polarization. However the 
mechanisms that underlie the core phenomenon of polarization, as we have defined it in 
the present manuscript, remain largely unchanged.  
A further, and related, avenue for future research concerns the role of node 
centrality in opinion contagion; this is an area where SST may make more distinctive 
predictions as noted above. Specifically, if a node is central to a network in that many of 
the shortest pathways between pairs of other agents pass through it, then the private 
attitude of that agent will likely have a larger effect on the expressed attitudes of other 
agents and will, on average, exert a dampening effect on the extremity of expressed 
                                               
13 With Weize Zhao 
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attitudes. Node in-degree is also important;  agents who get input from many other agents 
may have more social influence (Battiston & Stanca, 2015). 
Influence of group identity. Group identity is undoubtedly important in attitude 
formation and change (Clarkson, Tormala, Rucker, & Dugan, 2013). However SST does 
not represent group structure beyond the segregated clusters that emerge and produce 
polarization, and hence does not allow for greater influence from (otherwise-determined) 
group members, let alone the interplay between intergroup distinctiveness and 
differentiation (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 2001) or the different responses of peripheral 
and central group members (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997a, 1997b). We view this as 
both a limitation and an avenue for future research, and in the latter context note the 
existence of models that allow for effects of group structure on social contagion 
(Iacopini, Petri, Barrat, & Latora, 2019).   
Differences in attitudes and extent of polarization. SST models agents with 
only one attitude, and this is an important simplification because the multiple attitudes 
that real agents possess differ in the extent of polarization they are associated with. 
Indeed, we have assumed a simple unidimensional continuum to be the only dimension 
on which private attitudes and social norms differ. Moreover, the extent which 
polarization exists is often overestimated (Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007; Barberá et al., 
2015; Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, & Judd, 2015), as is the 
role of social media in polarization (Boxell et al., 2017; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011) and 
the idea that people pay selective attention to viewpoint-consistent media (Dubois & 
Blank, 2018). Attitudes appear more likely to polarize when they involve “take-off 
issues” (Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007), typically those relating more closely to 
fundamental ideology and values rather than, for example, sports and entertainment 
(Barberá et al., 2015). There may even be relevant differences between people who 
occupy different locations along a single attitudinal continuum. For example, liberals and 
conservatives seem to differ in the extent to which they see their values as being similar 
to those of other people within their political in-group (Boutyline & Willer, 2017; Stern, 
West, & Schmitt, 2014).  
How might such effects be incorporated in SST? Our simple implementation 
inevitably cannot do justice to the full richness of different psychological conceptions of 
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what attitudes really are, and there are many such views (Albarracín, Johnson, & Zanna, 
2005).  Set against this, an advantage of taking a computational approach as we have 
done here is that one is forced to be precise about what one means by an “attitude” 
because it must be specified in the implementation. Within the framework described, it is 
straightforward to represent differences in (a) the extent of social comparison associated 
with a given attitude, and (b) the precision of different attitudes. Thus, if agents are 
assumed to possess multiple attitudes, it is plausible that w is higher for some attitudes 
than others (depending, for example, on how central the attitudes are to either group or 
individual identity). It is also plausible that attitudes will vary in their precision, and both 
precision and w will influence the importance of attitudes for behavior (Howe & 
Krosnick, 2017). 
Social norm inference. We have assumed that agents infer social norms in their 
network neighborhood by fitting a distribution to the attitudes expressed by their 
immediate network neighbors (or, at least, behaving “as if” they are doing so), and we 
have assumed this process to be unbiased. This assumption is undoubtedly a 
simplification in a number of ways. Much research has examined the processes that 
underpin people’s sample-based inferences about and knowledge of distributions. One 
question is whether such estimates are accurate, and examinations of this question have 
produced mixed results (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006; Nisbett & Kunda, 1985), with for 
example findings of a bias towards unimodal estimates under some conditions (Lindskog, 
Winman, & Juslin, 2013b). Another question is whether people’s estimations of 
distributions take the form of continually-updated estimates of the distribution’s 
parameters, or are based on small samples retrieved at the time the distribution must be 
estimated. Most evidence supports the latter assumption (Lindskog, 2015; Lindskog & 
Winman, 2014; Lindskog, Winman, & Juslin, 2013a), consistent with the idea that people 
are naïve intuitive samplers (Juslin et al., 2007). Here we make no strong commitment 
about when social norms are estimated; all that is essential for SST is that people have 
access to knowledge about the prevailing social norm at the time they decide what 
attitude to express, and that the knowledge they have is sufficient to enable estimation of 
their relative rank. SST assumes that the expressed attitudes of all eight social network 
neighbors inform people’s estimation of the neighborhood social norm; people infer at 
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least something about distributions from as few as four data points (Lindskog, 2015), and 
the assumption that eight observations are considered does not seem too inconsistent with 
small-sampling assumptions.  
We have assumed that people have complete and full access to (or memory of) the 
expressed views of people surrounding them; we therefore ignore the possible effects of 
memory limitations (which may be important in, for example, explaining false consensus 
and false uniqueness effects: Galesic et al., 2013) and the search strategies that underpin 
social recall (Hills & Pachur, 2012). We have not included any “smoothing” of the 
characteristics of observed others, as Galesic et al. (2012) do in their social sampling 
model, and, more generally, we have not specified the nature of social sampling in detail 
(cf. Pachur et al., 2013; Schulze et al., 2020). 
 A related issue concerns the properties of the scale along which the social norm is 
represented. Unlike the private attitude distributions, which SST generally takes to be 
fixed and to have ratio-scale properties, the social norm estimates are based on 
observations (of the attitudes that other people express). We have assumed that such 
observations are unbiassed. However the subjective judgment of any one observation, 
taken in isolation, is likely to be affected by the context of other observations as would be 
predicted by most cognitive models of judgment. If the social norm is estimated from 
these contextually-influenced judgments of neighbors’ attitudes, the estimate will be 
flattened or distorted relative to the estimate that would be based on undistorted 
perceptions. We have not explored the consequences of such context effects in the 
present simulations, in part because they seem unlikely to affect the model’s behavior in 
any systematic qualitative way under the circumstances we have considered, and in part 
because we believe (although have not justified here) that contextualized subjective 
judgments are based on precisely the type of distribution-estimation that we have already 
assumed.  
Other psychological mechanisms. We have aimed to keep SST as simple as 
possible, and SST has just two free parameters (w and g) beyond the parameters 
specifying the beta distributions that characterize both private attitudes and the social 
norm. An additional learning rate parameter is used for explorations of convergence 
between private and expressed attitudes. We have opted to keep the model as simple as 
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possible because these additional mechanisms are not necessary to account for the 
phenomena we have addressed.  While it would be possible to endogenize the w 
parameter, such that its value is determined entirely by properties of the private attitudes 
and social norms, we opted not to do so as we believe it has a natural interpretation as an 
independent construct. For example, we speculate that some cross-cultural differences 
may be captured by the w parameter, such as differing relative emphasis on social 
harmony as opposed to tolerance of individualism (Markus & Kitayama, 1991); 
exploration of such links is however beyond the scope of the present manuscript. In 
addition, as noted above, w may vary for different attitudes (e.g., in terms of how central 
they are to identity). 
 
Implications 
 Finally, we note some broader implications of SST. There is wide concern 
surrounding “information bubbles” and internet-facilitated personalization (Pariser, 2011; 
Sunstein, 2007), and it has been suggested that “new media” make extreme views more 
sustainable (Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shapiro, 2005). Although we have noted important 
qualifications to some of the more general claims that have made in this area, SST offers 
one account of the psychological mechanisms that may underpin such processes when 
they do occur. Developments such as the greater availability and size of the internet, or 
increasing numbers of ever more specialized TV channels, makes it easier for individuals 
to find expressions of opinion similar to their own (such as extreme political blogs), and 
according to SST this provides an environment in which they can express views closer to 
their own (thus gaining authenticity-related utility) without suffering social extremeness 
aversion. Thus SST can explain how the ever more universal availability of information, 
as with the growth of the internet, may lead not to a coming-together of opinions and 
attitudes across societies as was originally predicted, but instead, at least in Anglicised 
Western nations, sometimes to precisely the opposite. SST specifies a mechanism by 
which exposure to conflicting viewpoints and alternative social norms should act against 
polarization (cf. the Contact Hypothesis: Allport, 1954; 1979). 
 Our approach also speaks to wider debates about the relationship between 
preferences, choices, and happiness. How should policy-makers identify policies that 
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maximize the well-being, or utility, of a society? According to a dominant strand within 
economics, the “revealed preferences” tradition (Samuelson, 1938), people’s preferences 
can only be inferred from their choices and hence one approach is to choose policies that 
allow people to have what they want as revealed by their choices. However there are 
many well-known problems with such an approach (Hausman, 2011; Hausman & 
McPherson, 2006) and hence various alternatives have been offered (Bernheim & Rangel, 
2009; Sugden, 2004). SST offers a psychological process framework within which to 
interpret a distinction between “decision utility” (what agents maximize when they 
choose what attitude to express) and “true utility” (the extent to which authentic 
preferences are satisfied). Given this distinction, we cannot infer what maximizes an 
individual’s “true” or “underlying” utility from their choice of attitude to express.  
 In summary, SST offers an account of polarization and a number of related 
phenomena within an agent-based modelling framework. SST’s core assumption is that 
agents’ choices of attitudes to express represent a utility-maximizing compromise 
between the competing demands of preferences for authenticity on the one hand, and 
aversion to social extremeness on the other. It is this assumption, together with the idea 
that attitudes and descriptive social norms must be represented as distributions rather than 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Demonstration Effect w g 
1.1 Social norm effects varies 20 
1.2 Norm consensus effects .5 20 
1.3 Backfire effects .3 and varies 20 
2.1 Polarization .5 and varies 20 and varies 
2.2 Network well-being .5 20 
2.3 Social contagion .8 varies 
2.4 False consensus .5 20 
2.5 Pluralistic ignorance .9 1 
S1 Relative rank effects n/a 15 
S2 Changing private attitudes .5 20 






Network behavior under different parameter values. Parameter values are a = 10, b = 
10, w = .5 and g = 20 except as indicated in the left-most column. Measures of disutility 
and false consensus are taken after 50,000 cycles of the simulation; polarization is the 





Parameters Disutility (SD) False Consensus (SD) Polarization (SD) 
g = 5 896.59 (2.14) 0.99 (0) 1.54 (0.01) 
g = 10 81.3 (0.8) 0.99 (0) 1.96 (0.02) 
g = 20 0.77 (0.04) 1 (0) 2.24 (0.02) 
g = 50 0 (0) 1 (0) 2.39 (0.02) 
w = .01 0.55 (0.01) 0.99 (0) 1.22 (0.00) 
w = .30 0.76 (0.11) 0.99 (0) 1.94 (0.01) 
w = .70 3.54 (0.76) 0.99 (0) 2.91 (0.04) 
w = .99 1.01 (0.06) 0.93 (0) 12.78 (0.53) 
a = 3; b = 3 13.7 (1.99) 0.98 (0) 1.78 (0.02) 
a = 10; b = 10 0.77 (0.06) 1 (0) 2.24 (0.02) 
a = 30; b = 30 0.57 (0) 0.99 (0) 2.22 (0.02) 
a = 3; b = 10 2.97 (0.4) 0.98 (0) 2.08 (0.03) 













Figure 1. Intuitive illustration of the effect of social norms on attitude expressed by an 
individual agent (see text for details). Solid lines represent the agent’s private attitude 
(vertical line shows median); circles represent attitudes expressed by social network 
neighbors; shaded lines represent the social norm inferred by the agent (vertical line 
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shows median); vertical dashed line shows the agent’s expressed attitude. The dark 
shaded area represents the extent to which the expressed attitude departs from median 













Figure 2. Social neighborhood (gray squares) of an agent (dark square) within a larger 












Figure 3. Illustration of attitudes with different medians (.3 for light and dark solid 
lines; .7 for dashed line) and different precisions but the same median (higher precision 









Figure 4. 4A: Disutility as a function of departure from authenticity and social norm. 4B: 
Utility (thin dark line) as a function of expressed attitude (horizontal axis) given the 













Figure 5. Effect of varying w parameter (relative concern with social extremeness 
aversion). Panel A: Utility-maximizing attitude as a function of w. Panel B: Disutility due 













































































Figure 12. Left panel: evolution over time of the expressed attitudes of various 









Figure 13. Distribution of expressed attitudes after the first cycle of the simulation (solid 































Figure 16. False consensus effects over time, represented as the correlation between the 
mean expressed attitudes of each agent’s neighbors and that agent’s expressed (solid line) 
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Demonstration S1: Relative rank and disutility. One key assumption of SST is 
that the disutility associated with expressing an attitude increases non-linearly with that 
atiitude’s extremity in a distribution (whether the distribution represents an agent’s 
private attitude or the social norm). In the case of the social norm, the intuition 
underlying the assumption is straightforward: One experiences the most disutility only if 
one is in the most extreme 5% to 10% of the social distribution (the exact numbers being 
determined by the value of the g  parameter; see main text Figure 4A). Provided an agent 
is in (say) the middle two quartiles of the social distribution, in contrast, they will 
experience little or no disutility due to social extremeness aversion and hence will not be 
motivated to change their behavior (i.e., the attitude that they express). We illustrate how 
this process may work — and offer some empirical evidence consistent with our 
assumption — using data from a resource dilemma experiment (Bilderbeck et al., 2014). 
Bilderbeck et al. examined how individuals changed their behavior from trial to trial as a 
function of their position in the social norm represented by other people’s behavior in the 
previous trial. Specifically, groups of four players chose, on each round of a repeated 
game, how many points (between 1 and 20) to harvest from a renewable resource. The 
initial level of the resource was 230; after each round it was reduced by the sum of the 
four players’ harvests and then replenished by a (noisy) number of points. It was 
therefore in players’ interests to restrain their harvests and conserve the resource, as no 
more harvesting would be possible once the resource was driven down.  
 The experiment examined how the amount a player chose to harvest was 
influenced by the amounts harvested by the other players on the previous round. Three of 
the four players were (unbeknownst to the fourth, who was the experimental participant) 
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confederates, and their harvests were controlled by the computer to induce variation in 
the social norm.14 The dependent variable of interest here was the change in harvest made 
by a participant on trial n as a function of their relative ranked position in the social norm 
on trial n-1. In intuitive terms, we might expect a participant who learned that their 
harvest was high in the social norm on trial n-1 (e.g., they harvest 16; the other three 
players harvest 9, 10, and 12) to reduce their harvest on trial n, while a participant who 
learned that their harvest on trial n was low in the social distribution (e.g., they harvest 6; 
the other three players harvest 9, 10, and 12) would be likely to increase their harvest on 
trial n. 
 This pattern is exactly what was found, and a summary of the results is shown in 
Figure S1. (Results are binned and averaged across participants; individual data plots and 
further methodological details are available in Bilderbeck et al., 2014). The graph shows 
that participants tended to reduce their harvests when their harvest in the previous round 
of the game ranked high within the social norm, and tended to increase their harvests 
when the amount they took in the previous round ranked low within the social norm. It is 
evident that the change in behavior (here, change in amount harvested) increases non-
linearly as social extremeness increases, just as assumed by SST. The solid line 
represents the exponential relation between utility loss and social extremeness assumed 
by SST (with g  = 15 and a scaling factor of 12).  
 The fit should be treated with caution, as the results come for an experiment 
involving a neuropharmacological manipulation and, as plotted, do not account for 
possible regression to the mean (see Bilderbeck et al., 2014 for analysis and discussion). 
Nonetheless, the results and model fit appear at least consistent with the idea that utility 
loss — and the resulting change in behavior — will be non-linear in rank as assumed by 
SST. 
 SST assumes that the same principle applies with regard to an agent’s own private 
attitude, in that an agent suffers relatively little loss of authenticity-related utility 
                                               
14 All participants were tryptophan-depleted before the experiment to reduce serotonin 
activity; half of the participants drank an amino acid drink containing tryptophan before 
completing the experiment and only data from those participants are shown here. 
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provided they are not expressing a view that is far out in the tail of the distribution that 
represents their own private attitude. We have kept the value of g  equal for private 
attitudes and social norms, as there is no need to do otherwise to capture the effects we 
examine, but this restriction could be relaxed if necessary. 
 We also note — but do not here explore — the possibility of individual 
differences in the g  parameter. Such differences would involve differences in relative 
sensitivity to different degrees of departure from authenticity or the social norm, rather 
than the overall sensitivity to social norms vs. authenticity, as the latter is represented by 
the w parameter. 
Demonstration S2: Allowing private attitudes to change. The assumption that 
agents’ private attitudes are fixed at the start of the process of segregation and 
polarization, and remain unchanged throughout, is central to most of the results we report 
in the main text.  In this demonstration we relax this assumption, allow private attitudes 
to align themselves gradually with expressed attitudes, and explore the effects of this 
alignment on polarization and on the distribution of private attitudes.   
We do this by introducing a convergence mechanism that causes each agent’s 
private attitudes to move, on each time cycle of the simulation, slightly in the direction of 
the attitudes that the agent expressed at the end of the previous cycle.15 Specifically, we 
start with the already-reported simulation of segregation and polarization (main text 
Demonstration 2.1). For our first convergence simulation, all parameter values remain the 
same as in Demonstration 2.1. One additional parameter (convergence rate) must be 
introduced. On each time cycle of the simulation we take the difference between each 
agent’s private attitude and the attitude they are expressing (as represented by the agent’s 
a and b parameters) and we add a proportion (specified by the convergence rate 
                                               
15 As in attitude updating in the main text demonstrations, we only implement the 
learning process for agents in the neighborhood of other agents who have changed 
location. It is of course possible to allow convergence of all agents on every simulated 
cycle; this simply results in very rapid convergence and effectively places the 
polarization process (which involves only one exchange per cycle) on a much (and, we 
believe, implausibly) slower timescale than the learning/convergence. 	
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parameter) of this difference onto their private attitudes. This leads to private and 
expressed attitudes gradually coming into line with one another. We set the convergence 
rate parameter to .2. 
Intuition suggests that the gradual convergence of private and expressed attitudes 
should lead to reducing, rather than increasing, polarization over time. This intuition is 
confirmed by the simulation, the key results of which are shown in Figure S2 (cf. main 
text Figure 13, which shows the behavior of the network when parameters are identical 
except for the inclusion of convergence). It is evident that polarization reduces 
throughout the simulation, whether measured by the attitudes expressed by given 
percentiles of the population (defined in terms of the extremity of the attitudes they 
express; left panel) or by the variance in expressed attitudes (right panel). As in main text 
Figure 13, lines represent the most extreme 5%, 20% and 40% of the population at either 
end of the attitude distribution. The tendencies for both false consensus and overall utility 
to increase over cycles of the simulation were similar to the behavior that was observed 
when convergence is not included (main text Figures 14 and 16) and hence are not shown 
here. 
 We also examined the final distribution of private attitudes in the learning model 
as a function of the social comparison parameter w. All other parameters remain as 
above, while w took values of .01, .30, .70, and .99. Figure S3 plots the (fitted, beta) 
distribution of private attitudes at the end of the 50,000 cycles of the simulation for each 
value of w. For reference, the distribution of mean attitudes at the start of the simulation 
(i.e., the beta(10,10) distribution from which those initial attitudes were drawn) is also 
shown on each panel. For all values of w the final distribution of attitudes is narrower 
than the initial distribution, reflecting a convergence of attitudes in the network overall 
when each individual agent tends to move towards the social norm in its neighborhood. 
Moreover, the final distribution of mean attitudes becomes narrower when the influence 
of the social norm is greater. We note, however, that behavior is parameter-dependent 
because the equilibrium state of the network depends on the relative time course of 
movement and attitude convergence. If the convergence parameter is very small, 
polarization will occur before there has been much convergence, whereas if the 
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convergence parameter is large the agents’ attitudes will have moved towards each other 
before significant polarization has happened. 
 In summary, as expected, allowing private attitudes to move gradually into 
conformity with expressed attitudes leads to reducing, rather than increasing, polarization 
over time. This confirms that the assumption of fixed private/underlying attitudes is 
central to SST’s explanation of polarization. Indeed, given that social influence is 
generally assumed to act in the direction of increasing homogeneity of expressed options, 
the assumed existence of private attitudes that act as a countervailing force is essential in 
SST to explain why social comparison may actually increase polarization.  
Demonstration S3: Effects of media or opinion leaders. The preceding 
demonstration (S2) explored the effects of allowing private/authentic attitudes to move 
gradually into conformity with expressed attitudes. In a final set of simulations we 
continue this exploration by investigating the consequences for private attitudes if every 
agent is exposed, on every time cycle, to a consistent set of opinions expressed by 
additional agents. This can be thought of as representing the exposure of every agent to 
the same set of expressed attitudes which could in turn be thought of as those 
promulgated by media sources or political leaders (Bail et al., 2018). 
The simulations proceed exactly as in S2 above, except that throughout the entire 
simulation the four diagonal neighbors of every agent are replaced by agents who 
consistently express an attitude of either .9 (one condition of the simulation) or .1 (other 
condition). This simulates the consumption of highly partisan media from one or other 
side of the political spectrum. The results are shown in Figures S4 and S5. Figure S4 
shows the expressed attitudes of the population over time, and reduction in attitude 
variance, when the “social media” agents consistently express an opinion of .1 (top two 
panels) or .9 (bottom two panels; main text Figure 12 shows the relevant comparisons). 
Figure S5 shows the final distributions of underlying attitudes in each case. It is clear that 
the addition of constant inputs to every agent’s opinion neighborhood has a strong effect; 
there is convergence of both private and expressed attitudes towards the attitudes 
displayed by the constantly-present agents. 
Demonstration S4: Alternative formulations of utility-extremeness function. 
When calculating how well conformity preferences are met when a given attitude is 
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expressed, extremeness is defined in terms of the area under the curve that represents the 
social norm. Specifically, “extremeness” is the area bounded by the expressed attitude 
and the median of the social norm (Figure 1).  We denote this area as H. In the model as 
described so far, disutility increases as a convex function of H (Figure 4a). The same 
convex function describes how disutility increases as the expressed attitude differs from 
the median of the distribution that represents private attitudes. Intuition suggests that any 
monotonically increasing function will lead to cases where the utility-maximizing attitude 
to express will fall somewhere in between the median of the authentic attitude and the 
median of the social norm (always assuming that the function is the same for authenticity 
preference and social extremeness aversion), and hence that polarization would continue 
to be seen. To confirm these intuitions, we examined the effects on network polarization 
of changing the form of the function from convex to concave. Specifically, we replaced 
equation 3 with:  
 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1 − 𝑒g(0@)	 	 (S1)	
 
and re-ran the simulation with all parameters unchanged except for g which was set to 5 
(instead of 20) in order to prevent disutility from increasing too quickly as a function of 
H (if g remains at 20, disutility is close to ceiling for any value of H greater than 
around .2).  
 The results we obtained were very similar to those obtained with the standard 
(convex) function, and as there were no qualitative differences we do not show the results 
graphically here. We also briefly examined the effect of reversing the relationship, such 
that expressing attitudes that were far from authentic attitudes and/or the social norm led 
to increased utility (a kind of “anticonformity”). As intuition suggests, this alternative 
utility/extremeness led to an unstructured network in which each agent attempts to 
become located as far away as possible from similar others while at the same time 
expressing a view as distant as possible from the median of their own authentic attitudes.  
Because we do not think this is a psychologically plausible model, we did not explore it 
further. An alternative model, in which authenticity preference was preserved but social 
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extremeness was preferred rather than avoided, led as expected to an outcome where 
agents expressed attitudes that were close to their median attitudes but each occupied its 









Figure S1. Non-linear behavior change as a function of ranked social extremeness on 








Figure S2. Left panel: evolution over time of the expressed attitudes of various 
percentiles of the population (with convergence between private and expressed attitudes).  
Right panel:  Attitude variance increasing over time (with convergence between private 








Figure S3. Final distributions (solid lines) of mean private attitudes after 50,000 cycles of 
learning for different values of w parameter. Initial distributions (dashed lines; same in 









Figure S4. Left panels: evolution over time of the expressed attitudes of various 
percentiles of the population (with convergence between private and expressed attitudes).  
Right panels:  Attitude variance increasing over time (with convergence between private 
and expressed attitudes). Top row: Simulated media consistently expresses .9; bottom 











Figure S5. Final distributions of underlying attitudes after simulated exposure to 
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